

275046


JPRS-USA-87-008

23 JULY 1987



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report



Soviet Union

**USA: ECONOMICS,
POLITICS, IDEOLOGY**

No 4, APRIL 1987

19980812 175

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

10
87
A05

23 JULY 1987

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

SOVIET UNION
USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 4, April 1987

[Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.]

CONTENTS

U.S., Soviet Concepts of Security (pp 3-12) (V.M. Berezhkov).....	1
The Pentagon's Near East Policy (pp 13-24) (A.K. Kislov, A.V. Frolov).....	13
Right Extremist Terror Under Cover of 'Democracy' (pp 25-34) (V.A. Vlasikhin, S.A. Chervonnaya).....	26
U.S. and Japanese Quality Control Systems (pp 35-43) (L.A. Konareva).....	38
Protection of Nature Reserves in Canada (pp 44-52) (V.I. Sokolov, Yu.M. Feygin) (not translated)	
U.S. Latin America Policy Examined (pp 53-59) (P.G. Litavrin).....	49
Causes and Implications of the Declining Exchange Rate of the Dollar (pp 59-62) (S.V. Gorbunov) (not translated)	

CONTENTS (Continued)

200-Mile Fishing Zone (pp 63-68) (A.N. Mikheyev) (not translated)	
Problems Facing 100th Congress (pp 69-77) (Yu.A. Ivanov).....	57
An Economic Alternative to the Arms Race (pp 78-87) (Seymour Melman) (not translated)	
Innovations in U.S. Machine Building (pp 88-97) (A.R. Daniyelov) (not translated)	
Dangerous Blunders (pp 98-101) (B.R. Izakov) (not translated)	
 Book Reviews	
Review of 'The New Direction in American Politics,' edited by J. Chubb and P. Peterson (pp 102-104) (Yu.F. Aleshchuk) (not translated)	
Review of U.S. Book on Military Expenditures (pp 104-105) (A.A. Voronkov, Yu.A. Ushanov).....	68
Review of 'Canadian Multinationals' by J. Niosi (pp 106-108) (A.G. Kvasov) (not translated)	
Review of 'The U.S. Supreme Court: Law and Politics' by O.A. Zhidkov (pp 108-109) (V.A. Savelyev) (not translated)	
Review of 'Industrial Espionage at the Service of the Monopolies' by R.M. Gasanov (pp 109-110) (A.L. Korovina) (not translated)	
Review of 'The Bourgeois Government and the Labor Market. Problems and Conflicts' by L.P. Dukhovnaya (p 110) (V.B. Supyan) (not translated)	
Review of 'The Other Side of the Dream: Episodes from 20th Century American Literature' by G. Zlobin (pp 110-111) (O.A. Alyakrinskiy) (not translated)	
Congressional Information, Analysis Services (pp 112-115) (M.A. Litvinova, V.N. Orlov).....	71
Vermont and New Hampshire (pp 116-123) (not translated)	
Letters to Editor (p 124) (not translated)	
Chronology of U.S.-Soviet Relations Dec 86-Feb 87 (pp 125-127).....	77

PUBLICATION DATA

English title : USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 4, April 1987

Russian title : SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : V.M. Berezhkov

Publishing House : Izdatelstvo Nauka

Place of publication : Moscow

Date of publication : April 1987

Signed to press : 13 March 1987

Copies : 31,000

COPYRIGHT : Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika,
politika, ideologiya", 1987

U.S., SOVIET CONCEPTS OF SECURITY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87
(signed to press 13 Mar 87) pp 3-12

[Article by V.M. Berezkhov: "Two Concepts of Security"; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] "The new way of POLITICAL THINKING should raise civilization to a qualitatively new level. This alone signifies that it will not entail just one single adjustment of views, but will represent a METHODOLOGY OF CONDUCTING INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS." This is how M.S. Gorbachev defined the new way of thinking when he addressed the Moscow international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World and for the Survival of Humanity."¹

The new way of thinking in foreign policy presupposes an accurate view of the realities of today's world and the realization that nuclear war will be a disaster for everyone without exception and that the deployment of nuclear weapons in space will undermine the security of all, including those striving for this. The new way of thinking is an acknowledgement of the fact that today's world is complex and multifaceted and that each of the many sovereign states in the world has the right to defend its own interests and to take an active part in world affairs. The new way of thinking also presupposes the awareness that nuclear arms, however highly perfected they might be, can no longer guarantee security.

In the Soviet Union the realization of the need for a new way of thinking was the result of a thorough analysis of the situation that had taken shape by the end of the 20th century. "We gave this a great deal of thought," M.S. Gorbachev said. "We criticized ourselves and others and asked ourselves hard questions before we could see the facts as they really were and we arrived at the conviction that new approaches and methods of solving international problems are needed in today's complex and contradictory world, which has reached a cross-roads."²

The concept of security elaborated by the 27th CPSU Congress is an important element of the new way of thinking in the nuclear age. As the political report of the CPSU Central Committee said, "genuine equal security in our age is guaranteed by a strategic balance at the lowest possible level, and not the highest, and a balance from which all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction have been excluded."³

The actual attainment of this goal will require the participation and goodwill of governments, parties, public organizations, and movements valuing peace. The Soviet concept envisages the CREATION OF AN ALL-ENCOMPASSING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, the bases of which were described as the following.

In the military sphere--the refusal of the nuclear powers to fight nuclear or conventional wars with each other or with third states; the prevention of an arms race in space, the termination of all nuclear tests, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, and the refusal to develop other weapons of mass destruction; the strictly regulated reduction of the military potential of the states to the point of reasonable sufficiency; the dissolution of military groups and, as a step toward this, the refusal to enlarge them or to form new ones; the proportional and balanced reduction of military budgets.

In the political sphere--respect in international practices for the right of each nation to sovereignly choose the patterns and forms of its development; the just political resolution of international crises and regional conflicts; the development of a group of measures to strengthen confidence between states and to establish effective guarantees against invasion from outside and guarantees of the inviolability of their borders; the development of effective methods of preventing international terrorism. Important proposals were also set forth in the economic and humanitarian spheres.⁴

All of this is a logical extension of the provisions of the CPSU Program and is consistent with the foreign policy initiatives and actions of the Soviet Government. The many extensions of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests, the program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, set forth in the well-known statement of 15 January 1986, the bold and massive steps taken by the countries of the socialist community to strengthen trust and to reduce conventional arms and armed forces in Europe, the USSR's declaration of its willingness to completely eliminate chemical weapons, and the important initiatives the Soviet side put forth at the summit meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik--all of this testifies that the USSR is demonstrating its adherence to the new way of thinking in actions rather than in words.

One of the most important results of the reassessment of foreign policy approaches is the conclusion that security in international relations in general can only be universal, while security in U.S.-Soviet relation can only be mutual. These are the fundamentals of the Soviet concept of security.

This concept lay at the basis of M.S. Gorbachev's proposal at the end of February that the issue of intermediate-range missiles in Europe be excluded from the group of problems to be discussed in Reykjavik and that a separate agreement be concluded on these weapons without delay. As he said, the new way of thinking presupposes the ability to "understand the concerns and interests of other peoples and not to distinguish between one's own security and the security of one's neighbors."

What is the U.S. concept of security? It is not as easy to formulate, and this is due not only to the conflicting positions of different administrations but

also to the conflicting positions within the current Republican administration. Many different interpretations of U.S. national security and many different definitions of foreign policy goals can be found in the speeches of President Reagan and his closest advisers. There have been several recent statements in favor of positive East-West dialogue and in favor of a Soviet-American disarmament agreement. At the same time, however, the anti-Soviet rhetoric has not stopped.

We know that the summit meeting in the Icelandic capital was the scene of the unprecedented convergence of the positions of the two sides, and that this was followed by Washington's departure from its Reykjavik position. An analysis of the summit meeting a few months afterward in THE WASHINGTON POST said that "the Reykjavik summit will apparently be of great historic significance, although its exact results are still unknown. The two leaders took many new and important steps in Iceland. The positions they took on strategic arms and medium-range weapons and on nuclear tests brought the two countries closer to the conclusion of major agreements. Their willingness to review the restrictions on space systems research and testing in the ABM treaty laid the basis for a possible future agreement. Their discussion of the elimination of all ballistic missiles, or all strategic arms, or all nuclear weapons set new objectives. The talks Reagan and Gorbachev had in Reykjavik will have a profound effect on all future relations between the United States and the USSR."⁵

This is very close to the Soviet assessment of Reykjavik: "It was a breakthrough, and not a failure. It was not just another dialogue, but a moment of truth, revealing the great prospect of a nuclear-free world."⁶

We recall, however, that the meeting in the Icelandic capital was described as a failure in the first official responses from Washington. This was followed by bittersweet assessments, and in January 1987 a report by a special group on defense policy of the House Committee on the Armed Services expressed doubts about whether the Reagan Administration had taken a position in Reykjavik guaranteeing the best possible defense of the interests of the United States and its allies. The authors of the report concluded that the administration was unprepared for the talks and that the Soviet side's flexibility and Reagan's lack of specific plans of his own made the "progress" at the talks "go too far, transcending all possible bounds and giving the United States nothing but feelings of confusion and disillusionment."

Obviously, the congressmen from the special group on defense policy knew more about the American delegation's degree of preparedness for the talks in Reykjavik, but since the Soviet initiatives set forth in Iceland and President Reagan's responses to them are well known, the dissatisfaction of the legislators suggests that they expected the Icelandic summit to lead not to an agreement on the reduction of nuclear arms and their elimination within a period of 10 years, but to something completely different. Although the report does not say so specifically, it is quite probable that the legislators did not like the idea of the equal security of the USSR and the United States--the very basis of the Soviet proposals.

If we examine the issue of security in a broader context and look back 15 years into the past, when several important Soviet-American agreements were reached at the Moscow summit meeting in May 1972, this experience also testifies to the contradictory and ambiguous American position. At that time, along with concrete arms limitation agreements, the international legal standards of coexistence were formulated and signed by the chief executives of the two countries--the "Basic Principles of Soviet-U.S. Relations." This document contained provisions of fundamental importance:

The principle of the peaceful coexistence of the USSR and the United States, unimpeded by differences in ideology and social systems;

A mutual pledge to avoid military confrontation, prevent the start of the nuclear war, and show restraint;

The willingness to negotiate and settle disputes by peaceful means in an atmosphere of mutual consideration and mutual advantage;

Recognition of the security interests of the sides, based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use of force or threats of force;

The acknowledgement that attempts to gain unilateral advantages, either directly or indirectly, at the expense of the other side are incompatible with the declared goals;

The agreement to put contacts and cooperation between the two powers on a strong and lasting basis;

The statement that the USSR and the United States do not claim and do not recognize the claims of any other party to special rights or advantages in world affairs and that they recognize the sovereign equality of all states.⁷

This document could have marked the beginning of a transfer from the excesses of the cold war to a lengthy period of detente and to peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation if these commitments had been honored.

It must be said that when the atmosphere of detente was still being maintained, it was relatively easy to neutralize dangerous threats to the cause of peace. For example, in fall 1973 an armed conflict in the Middle East was localized and extinguished through the joint efforts of the USSR and the United States. Detente had a favorable effect on negotiations and led to the curtailment of the American aggression against Vietnam and the establishment of peace in Indochina. Even when detente became a burden to some people in Washington and when President Ford ostentatiously refused to use the term in his campaign, the American side had no objection to making use of the favorable situation in the final act of the Vietnam drama.

At that time, in early spring 1975, I was working on an assignment in Washington. I had known Nelson Rockefeller since the way (he was one of President F. Roosevelt's advisers) and had stayed in contact with him later. I decided to visit Rockefeller, who was then vice-president of the United

States. I was given an appointment in what is known as the "Executive Building," adjacent to the White House. The secretary warned me that the vice-president had only 10 minutes to spare, but we spent almost an hour discussing a variety of topics. The main one was the situation in Vietnam.

"The atmosphere in our embassy in Saigon," Rockefeller said, "is now extremely tense. We have made a firm decision to leave Vietnam, but there is too much military pressure against evacuation. We have to evacuate embassy personnel and our local friends. It seems to me that the trusting relationship detente has given our two countries grounds to expect Moscow to help us do this and convey our request to Hanoi that it ease up on this pressure and let us evacuate as planned...."

We remember the televised footage of the flight of American personnel and their "local friends" from the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. It is true that this was a time of terrible panic. But something else about this incident is interesting--the fact that this kind of request was made, and with references to the atmosphere of detente, which had already become a dirty word in Washington by that time. Incidentally, even later, after President Carter had laid the idea of detente to rest, many high-level American officials I spoke with expected help from Moscow, particularly in the release of the hostages who were taken in Tehran after the fall of the shah.

These incidents prove that people in Washington also realized that maintaining the atmosphere of detente could have helped in solving many problems and would have had a favorable effect on the international climate. Nevertheless, the United States derailed the process of detente. It was apparently inconsistent with the prevailing concept of national security there.

There was once a great deal of theorizing about the factors motivating Nixon, who was such a patent anticommunist, to seek agreements with Moscow. Some people mentioned the awareness of the inevitability of American imperialism's defeat in Vietnam and the desire of ruling circles to climb out of the quagmire of the dirty war they had started. Other mentioned the tense atmosphere in the United States itself, where the aggression in Indochina was being protested on such a broad scale and there was mounting antiwar feeling. This explosive situation just before the 1972 elections could have led to the loss of the presidency. Besides this, the mood of the voters indicated unequivocally that agreements with the USSR would give the candidate a greater advantage in the race for the presidency than an old anticommunist platform.

Complications in U.S. relations with the European allies also played a part. The FRG's "new eastern policy" and the increasing support in Western Europe for the normalization of relations with the USSR and other countries of the socialist community alarmed Washington. When it became obvious that the issuance of peremptory orders to obstinate allies would only isolate Washington, people there began to review the situation.

The Soviet Union's achievement of military parity with the United States and the USSR's successes in space travel, which showed the world the tremendous potential and unlimited possibilities of the socialist system, were of

decisive significance. Some members of U.S. ruling circles began to realize that the continued escalation of the arms race would not produce the anticipated results and that the development of more and more new systems of lethal weapons was making the United States more vulnerable instead of more secure. This is how the prerequisites for constructive Soviet-American dialogue were established.

As for the USSR, it invariably expressed its willingness to improve relations with the United States, proceeding from the Leninist idea of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. The foreign policy decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress (1971), where the final draft of the Program of Peace was composed, were based precisely on this idea.

Analyzing the factors leading to the USSR-U.S. agreements of that time, Soviet authors were already wondering in the beginning of the 1970's whether or not these changes would be strong and viable or would be just a fleeting episode in the development of world events. As Academician G.A. Arbatov stressed, "the changes in question, like anything new, are still quite fragile. They came into being as a result of struggle and could remain the object of struggle."⁸ Furthermore, there was the consideration that in the United States, just as in other capitalist countries, there are tendencies toward adaptation to new realities and other, diametrically opposed tendencies. The groups representing these enjoyed considerable domestic support and had the force of habit on their side, the force of inertia engendered by the lengthy period of cold war and the propaganda of hatred for the Soviet Union, which planted the "image of the enemy" in people's minds. It was also pointed out that these positive changes could be jeopardized by the atmosphere in the parts of the world where military conflicts and tension still existed.

Later events confirmed this opinion. By the middle of the 1970's there was a noticeable shift toward confrontation in Washington policy under pressure from the extreme right. Western propaganda portrayed this as a reaction to some kind of Soviet actions "undermining detente." In fact, however, it was just a matter of the increasing strength of the particular elements of the American ruling elite that had always opposed any kind of agreements with the USSR. They refused to accept military parity and the principle of equal security and decided to make a new attempt at making the United States superior to the USSR. Looking back at the events of this time, famous American political scientist W. Pfaff noted that "balance...was not the goal of the United States. Doctor Kissinger certainly did not want a counterbalance to American strength."⁹ In view of this, it was time to reject parity, the principle of equality and equivalent security agreed upon in Moscow, and the pledge in the "Basic Principles" not to strive for unilateral advantages at the expense of the other side. Washington's departure from the Moscow agreements was apparent within a few months, when the ratification of the Soviet-American trade agreement envisaging the mutual granting of most-favored-nation status was blocked in Congress by the Jackson-Vanik amendment, representing flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the USSR.

The Washington administration's political maneuvers during and after the Arab-Israeli armed conflict of 1973 also signaled a departure from the agreements.

It is no longer a secret to anyone that the purpose of these was to exclude the Soviet Union from the Mideast settlement talks. In his memoirs, then Secretary of State H. Kissinger does not conceal the fact that he resorted to his "shuttle diplomacy" in an effort to shut out the USSR and to make both Israel and Egypt clients of the United States.¹⁰

Washington later systematically undermined the Soviet-American agreements by causing the relations between the two powers to regress to confrontations. This process was continued under the Carter Administration. Soon there was not even a trace of the trust which had existed, however fragile it might have been, and had aided in the settlement of conflicts in the beginning of the 1970's.

When President Reagan arrived in the White House, the pendulum of American politics swung sharply to the right. Rumors were spread about "Soviet superiority," the notorious "window of vulnerability" came into being, and the Soviet Union and socialist community were portrayed as the "evil empire," which had to be thrown on the "trash heap of history" as quickly as possible. Administration officials openly discussed the possibility of winning a nuclear war and started a new round of the arms race. In other words, Washington returned to the idea of "overwhelming military superiority" and of dealing with the USSR "from a position of strength."

Although the Republican administration's policy line posed a threat to the United States itself, it did not arouse any special anxiety in the country at first. On the contrary, many Americans applauded the President. John Galbraith, the world-renowned economist, says that the explanation for this phenomenon lies in the specific experience of Americans, who did not suffer from either world war. "Although the constant fear of nuclear war now exists in the United States and in the Soviet Union," Galbraith wrote, "for the Russians this is a more tangible threat. For more than a century American wars have been fought far away. But we live in a small and truly unique enclave on the surface of the earth which has escaped the devastation and horrors of war, and we are inclined to believe that this will always be the case. The Russians have a different view of things. Their experience--from Napoleon to World War I, the civil war, and World War II--has included military invasions and devastation. It is this, and not the possibility of escaping this fate, that determines their approach. For this reason, all of the belligerent talk of the current administration and the Pentagon in recent years--talk about limited nuclear war, about protracted nuclear war, and about prevailing in a nuclear war--has probably had much greater repercussions in the USSR than in the United States."¹¹

Galbraith describes the hope of "surviving" a nuclear war, which is still widespread in the United States, as a dangerous illusion. He has said: "I believe in the need for nuclear arms control because I am convinced that the ashes of communism will be indistinguishable from the ashes of capitalism after an exchange of nuclear strikes.... Nuclear arms control, however, presupposes a certain level of trust between the two states."¹²

Here we return to the concept of security, because its correct definition as mutual security is an essential element of the climate of trust.

The Republican administration's belligerent rhetoric could and did only lead to anxiety and doubts about Washington's policy line in the Americans themselves and in their allies. The resulting situation, despite the American illusions about the possibility of "surviving" a nuclear war and despite Reagan's overall popularity, forced the White House to undertake certain maneuvers. The 1984 presidential elections were approaching and it was time to worry about losing votes. As American historian and diplomat Raymond Garthoff says in his book "Detente and Confrontation," the Reagan Administration "lost much of [the consensus] in American public opinion with regard to the need for an arms buildup and senseless waste. The administration was losing the trust of the allies instead of strengthening it. The breach between the United States and Western Europe grew wider, in spite of the conservative shift in West Germany and Great Britain.... In 1984 the Reagan Administration tried to make up for its losses on many of these fronts and managed to make the transition to a more constructive policy line by the beginning of his second term."¹³

The Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva was held in November 1985. The leaders of the two powers reaffirmed an important commitment in a joint statement: "To prevent an arms race in space and to stop the race on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms, and to strengthen strategic stability." The admission that "nuclear war must never be started, there can be no winners in this war" was of special importance. The two leaders declared that "any conflict between the USSR and the United States could have disastrous effects," they stated the need to prevent any kind of war between the two countries, nuclear or conventional, and they pledged not to strive for military superiority.¹⁴

Once again, we witnessed the inconsistency of American policy, just as we had so many times in the past. Now that the Reagan Administration is effectively breaking the ABM treaty by insisting on its "broader interpretation," it is nullifying an earlier American president's signature on the open-ended 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and Reagan's own signature on the joint Soviet-American statement approved in Geneva.

The second meeting of M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in October 1986 in the capital of Iceland raised USSR-U.S. relations to a new level. Reykjavik proved that agreement on the reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons was possible. This is why the opponents of Soviet-American agreements are trying to nullify this meeting. Once again, we can only wonder which position reflects Washington's real understanding of U.S. national security: the one recorded in the ABM treaty and the Geneva statement or the one used as a guide in the renunciation of Geneva and Reykjavik and the violation of the ABM treaty for the sake of the quicker deployment of lethal weapons in space?

President Reagan's report on "The National Security Strategy of the United States," distributed by the White House on 28 January 1987, shed some light on the Reagan Administration's interpretation of security.¹⁵ This is a lengthy document, taking over a hundred pages to define U.S. policy in all parts of the world. It says that the current administration's general goal is "freedom and prosperity throughout the world." The document goes on to declare the

willingness to "take a realistic approach to relations with the Soviet Union" and "seek constructive ways of cooperating with the USSR for the prevention of war and the consolidation of peace throughout the world." After verbally advocating cooperation, the author of the report moves on to the crux of the matter.

The entire document is filled with the hackneyed propaganda cliches about the "expansionist aims of the Soviet Union," about the "threat from Moscow," about the "Soviet type of totalitarianism and communism," etc. Washington is trapped in the ice of another cold war. It is as if there had been no Soviet compromise proposals reinforced by actions, as if the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests had not been repeatedly renewed, as if the two last summit meetings had not taken place, and as if the positions of the USSR and the United States had not converged in Reykjavik. The Washington administration still sees the "face of the enemy" when it looks at the Soviet Union.

The rapid buildup of lethal weapons is validated in the report by the allegation that "the global threat posed by the Soviet Union is the most serious threat to the security and national interests of the United States." It is here that the fundamental difference between the two concepts of security--American and Soviet--can be seen. Although American imperialism's hegemonic ambitions pose a serious threat to all people, the Soviet side believes that the main threat hanging over mankind in our age is nuclear war, and this belief is shared by broad segments of the world public. This is why people in the USSR believe in the need for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. People in Washington, on the other hand, are using false premises to substantiate the need for a buildup of weapons of mass destruction and their deployment in space.

In reference to the protection of American interests, President Reagan says in his report that the United States must be prepared to "ward off any military invasion and end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States." The reader should not be misled: This was written not in 1981, but now, in 1987, but it certainly sounds like the statements made at the beginning of the 1980's! What is this--a return to the adventuristic theses of President Reagan's first term or simply a reaffirmation of an immutable policy which was only covered by the fig leaf of a "change in course" for tactical reasons? Or is it possible that the presidential report was not shown to Ronald Reagan? After all, this also happens.

The section on U.S. interests contains equally amazing avowals: For example, the statement that American strategy must secure "the development of the freedom of democratic institutions and economies oriented toward the free market **THROUGHOUT THE WORLD**" (emphasis ours--V.B.). It looks as though Washington has returned to an idea popular in the first years after the war--the idea of spreading the American model of the capitalist system to the entire world! And what about the statement in the 1972 "Basic Principles" that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the nuclear age?

The globalist ambitions of American imperialism are clearly revealed in this report. The section on military policy says: "Our national security strategy,

our global aims, and the very nature of the threat make it essential that we be prepared to protect our interests on frontiers at the maximum distance from North America." It goes on to say: "We will continue to keep large land, naval, and air forces in Europe, in the Atlantic and the Pacific, and other forces in the Western Hemisphere and the Indian Ocean on advance frontiers in peacetime." The explanation for all of this is that "the challenge made to us is dynamic and complex."

But what is this challenge? Can it be found in the Delhi declaration, in the principles of a nuclear-free and non-violent world, appealing for respect for the right of each nation to make its own choices--social, political, and ideological--and the renunciation of the use of force and threats of force? Or is the challenge the proposal M.S. Gorbachev made in Vladivostok regarding the inclusion of the Asian-Pacific region in the overall process of creating a comprehensive system of international security?

In the presidential report we read: "The comprehensive and creative unification of the military potential of the United States and our allies is needed to reduce the risk to our national security." Again we see that people in Washington think about U.S. security only in terms of strength. The report definitely stresses the willingness of the United States to use nuclear weapons, and not only for a retaliatory strike, but whenever it chooses. "It is extremely important," the document says, "that the effectiveness of our strategic potential and our will to use it, if the need for this should arise, will never be doubted."

The report makes unfounded claims to U.S. "access to foreign markets and to foreign power resources and minerals." The report says nothing about the attitude of the states owning these resources and minerals toward these claims. It does, however, stress that "military strength, economic vitality, and strong American military potential are indispensable in the retention of the stable and secure surroundings in which diplomacy can be effective and in which our adversaries can be deterred." Here we see a return to the classic formula of the use of military muscle as a continuation of diplomacy. This is why the United States needs military bases all over the world. The sovereignty and security interests of other countries are of no consequence! They can only hope that Washington will not regard them as adversaries if they dare to resist the American solicitations.

The presidential report states the need to "force the Soviet Union to bear most of the burden of its domestic economic difficulties." And we find this in a document beginning with Reagan's declared intention to "seek constructive ways of cooperating" with the USSR! And this is not all. The statement in the report about the United States' intention to "stimulate tendencies toward liberalization" in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is quite indicative of the mood in the White House. After all, everyone knows that the term "liberalization" has served throughout the postwar period as a cover for Washington's attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist states.

The contents of the presidential report attest to the cardinal differences between the approaches of the Soviet Union and the United States, especially

to security issues. It corroborates the fact that Washington still wants to negotiate from a position of strength and military superiority. The job of strengthening U.S. security is regarded there as a matter of building up arms on earth and in space, weakening the USSR, and securing unilateral advantages and key positions on the planet for the United States.

The Soviet Union, as its leadership has repeatedly stressed, believes that security can only be universal in the nuclear age. No power should try to strengthen its security by weakening the security of the other side. This is simply unrealistic. The USSR believes that negotiations should be conducted not from a position of strength, but on an equal basis, with consideration for the legitimate interests of the sides and in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and goodwill. Any power's claims to any kind of exclusive rights in the world are unfounded, and all attempts to achieve superiority and to teach others how to conduct their own affairs are dangerous. These attempts are futile and can only complicate the situation in the world. Finally, in contrast to Washington's ambiguous position, the Soviet Union firmly believes that nuclear war is an impossibility, that there can be no winners in it, and that it would mean the end of human civilization and all life on the planet.

We can agree with the conclusion in the presidential report that the rivalry between the USSR and the United States will continue in the near future, with the stipulation that their relations must remain peaceful. We must not ignore the fact, however, that in addition to this rivalry, there are areas of cooperation and negotiation in our relations even now. It is particularly important that the new Soviet initiatives paved the way for the actual drafting of an agreement on the elimination of American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

Of course, this will not be a smooth process. A long and hard struggle lies ahead. Its outcome will depend largely on an accurate understanding of security interests in the nuclear age.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 17 February 1987.
2. Ibid.
3. "Materialy XXVII sъezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 65.
4. Ibid., pp 74-76.
5. THE WASHINGTON POST, 16 February 1987.
6. PRAVDA, 17 February 1987.
7. SSHA: EPI, 1972, No 8, pp 113-114.

8. Ibid., p 11.
9. W. Pfaff, "Kissinger and Nixon," THE NEW YORKER, 13 September 1982, p 159.
10. H. Kissinger, "Years of Upheaval," Boston-Toronto, 1982, pp 616-666.
11. J. Galbraith, "A Visit to Russia," THE NEW YORKER, 3 September 1984, pp 64-65.
12. Ibid., p 54.
13. R. Garthoff, "Detente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan," Wash., 1985, p 1064.
14. PRAVDA, 22 November 1985.
15. "National Security Strategy of the United States," The White House, Wash., January 1987.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1987

8588
CSO: 1803/08

THE PENTAGON'S NEAR EAST POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87
(signed to press 13 Mar 87) pp 13-24

[Article by A.K. Kislov and A.V. Frolov: "The Middle East and the Pentagon"]

[Text] When M.S. Gorbachev was interviewed by Indian journalists on 21 November 1986, he said in reference to the problems in the Middle East that there is a growing awareness in the international community today "of the need to put the resolution of the problems in this extremely important and explosive region on the international level."

The Middle East has long been viewed by American military strategists as a potential theater of military operations. This became particularly apparent at the start of the Reagan Administration, which has augmented the "rapid deployment force" (RDF), conducted more active talks with local regimes on access to military bases and installations, created a special Mideast command, Centcom, and began the direct planning of military operations in the region. In particular, schedules have been drawn up and routes, forces, and resources have been defined for the transfer of an interventionist corps to this region. This administration has repeatedly resorted not only to shows of strength, but also to the overt use of American armed forces in the Middle East,¹ which has seriously alarmed the international public.

Two main functions with far from only regional implications have been assigned to the U.S. armed forces slated for combat in this region, especially the RDF. On the one hand, they are supposed to guarantee the safety of oil shipping lanes, including those used for the shipment of oil to Western Europe, and support pro-Western and pro-American regimes when necessary. On the other hand, and in a broader context, the U.S. politico-military leadership is striving to establish a bridgehead in the region on the approaches to the Soviet Union's southern borders. To this end, attempts are being made to eliminate or undermine progressive regimes and actual or potential allies of the USSR.

New Features of the Situation in the Middle East

When the Reagan Administration decided to pursue these military-strategic goals in the Middle East, it also had to make serious changes in its tactics

in the region, partly under the influence of regional events and partly as a result of its own military, diplomatic, and other failures.

Some new features which will certainly have a serious effect on U.S. politico-military activity in the Middle East have appeared in recent years. The most important factors compelling Washington to make certain changes in its Middle East policy are the following.

Above all, there was the forced and humiliating withdrawal of the American military contingent from Lebanon, as well as the rest of the "multinational force" in this country, at the beginning of 1984. The United States' obvious military fiasco in Lebanon noticeably strengthened the doubts of pro-Western Arab groups, doubts engendered by the events in Iran, about the ability of the United States to effectively defend a friendly regime, even with the use of its own armed forces. Furthermore, the military coup in Sudan in April 1985, during which one of the most pro-American Arab leaders, G. Nimeiri, was overthrown, provided new proof that a close alliance with Washington does not guarantee the survival of a pro-American leader or regime.

Besides this, the increasing activity of fundamentalist Muslims, representing reactionary forces in general, although they do oppose American and any other military presence in the region and close cooperation and alliance with the United States in the military sphere, must also be taken into account by pro-Western governments in Arab countries, some of which see the fundamentalists as a serious threat to their own existence. In their attempts to "pacify" fundamentalist groups, these governments verbally, and sometimes actually, dissociate themselves from excessively close military cooperation with the United States and are not as eager to satisfy Washington's demands in the military sphere.

There is no doubt that the development of certain centrifugal tendencies in American-Arab military relations is being promoted by the tough and aggressive Middle East policy of the United States itself, which has been largely discredited in Arab eyes. The increasingly open U.S. reliance on Israel, which, as Washington's "strategic ally," is being promised a qualitative military advantage in the form of the latest weaponry, is arousing a great deal of displeasure even in pro-Western Arab circles, especially in view of the aborted shipments of American weapons to Jordan and the delays in shipments to Saudi Arabia.

Washington's unconcealed support of the Israeli aggression in Lebanon and the Israeli air raid on Palestinian camps on the outskirts of Tunis; the interception of the Egyptian civilian airliner by American aviation in the international air space over the Mediterranean Sea; the virtually constant escalation of tension in Lebanon, evolving into acts of overt aggression; the political scandal which broke out after it was learned that the United States was secretly intervening in the Iran-Iraq armed conflict by supplying Iran with weapons and spare parts for military equipment--this is far from a complete list of recent American actions which have complicated U.S. relations with Arab countries, including pro-Western groups in these countries.

The interception of the Egyptian plane probably had the strongest psychological impact on these groups. In the majority of Arab countries Washington's brazen act was indignantly seen as a show of obvious contempt for the "key Arab ally" which the United States has been zealously taking care of for several years and with which it maintains close military relations. In the opinion of pro-Western Arab leaders, if the United States could treat Egypt in this way, Washington's other Arab partners could expect even less "respect." The Egyptian public was so indignant that President H. Mubarak of Egypt felt the need to make a vehemently anti-American speech in connection with this unceremonious act.

As a result of all this, the Arab countries maintaining the closest relations with the United States displayed a common tendency to distance themselves from Washington. The leaders of many pro-Western Arab regimes who had previously relied almost completely on the United States are now paying more attention to the development of relations with other states--European, Latin American (Brazil, for example), and socialist countries, including the PRC. In connection with this, it is indicative that Oman, whose territory is regarded by the Pentagon as a possible location for the RDF, established diplomatic relations with the USSR. The United Arab Emirates followed its example. Some positive tendencies in the position of the Somali regime, which entered into negotiations with Ethiopia to settle their differences, probably also testify to disillusionment with American assistance and support. Another striking development is the tendency of the leaders of Jordan and Egypt to admit the need for an international peace conference on the Middle East with the obligatory inclusion of the Soviet Union, thereby demonstrating their dissatisfaction with U.S. "peacemaking efforts."

Changes in the Middle East policy of the United States are also needed because the failure of the direct U.S. military intervention in Lebanon led to heated arguments about the advisability of the direct use of American armed forces, especially the Army and the Marines, for the attainment of political goals, including goals in the Middle East. When the Americans and their Israeli allies encountered a type of combat unfamiliar to them--partisan warfare--in the region, they could not plan effective countermeasures. Washington has been particularly disturbed by the "terrorist suicide missions," because the events in Lebanon show that neither American military installations nor U.S. diplomatic offices are defended sufficiently against these attacks. "Military countermeasures," political correspondent Flora Lewis remarked in a NEW YORK TIMES article, "whether they are commensurate or, as some say, are deliberately incommensurate, cannot put an end to this problem. They only compound the unrest and disillusionment."²

The events in Libya also proved, however, that Pentagon officials have begun to concentrate, presumably with the encouragement of the White House, on massive air and even missile strikes against targets in Arab countries instead of on the use of ground troops and the Marines, because the former type of operation, according to the U.S. politico-military leadership, does not cause heavy personnel losses on the American side and, consequently, cannot create serious domestic problems for the administration.

Washington's Maneuvers in the Region

It is quite probable that the Reagan Administration is beginning to realize how vulnerable its military position in the Middle East is. Many of the military and politico-military plans it proposed during the first years of Reagan's term in office, which were aimed at creating an additional infrastructure for the RDF and uniting the pro-Western states of the region in a politico-military group on an anti-Soviet basis, have either not been carried out or have encountered serious difficulties. Under these conditions, Washington has had to neutralize the negative impact of its own actions in the Middle East. As for the Pentagon, it is trying to raise the problem-ridden military cooperation between the United States and the pro-Western Arab countries to a new level. To this end, it appears to be taking steps in several directions.

Above all, the Pentagon is striving to rehabilitate the military strength and determination of the United States in Arab eyes and to neutralize the effects of the Lebanon fiasco by proving that the American military machine can "severely and effectively punish adversaries." This was clearly revealed at the time of Washington's aggressive actions against Libyan Jamahiriya, which American propaganda portrayed as the "bold victory of American arms" and a "demonstration of Washington's firmness."³ Official White House spokesman R. Simms made the following remark immediately after the raid: "This was an almost faultless professional operation conducted under extremely difficult conditions. I do not think there is anything else like it in the annals of American military history."⁴ It was later learned that this was not such a "faultless" operation, but this is a different matter.

American arms shipments are another area of Pentagon activity. Regarding them as an important way of keeping the pro-Western Arab countries within the U.S. political orbit, the Reagan Administration sharply escalated programs of military aid to these countries in its first 3 years in the White House. Later, people in Washington apparently realized that arms shipments, which once served as an element attaching the recipient countries to the United States, also created many new problems requiring a completely different approach. Shipments of American arms to Arab countries began to be stabilized in 1983 and then to be reduced. Now Western Europe is the main supplier of arms to the region.

This tendency is largely due to the reluctance of the leaders of some pro-Western regimes in the Middle East to give anyone an excuse to accuse them of excessively close contacts with Washington. Although the weapons purchased from France, England, the FRG, Italy, Brazil, China, and some other countries might be slightly inferior to American weapons, they are much cheaper and, what is most important, these shipments are not conditional upon strict political commitments.

The desire of Arab countries to diversify their sources of arms was confirmed when Saudi Arabia signed a contract with England in February 1986 on the purchase of 132 military aircraft (72 Tornado fighters and 60 training planes) for a total of 7 billion dollars; the huge military transactions between Arab

countries and Brazil and China became common; Egypt made persistent efforts to develop its own military industry (Egypt plans to begin selling its military products to "moderate" Arab regimes, seeing this as one way of restoring relations with them); and so forth.

The United States is still trying to strengthen its own military position in the region, however, particularly by taking advantage of the tension in the Persian Gulf in connection with the perceptibly increasing scales of the Iran-Iraq war, which have seriously alarmed the monarchic Arab regimes. In June 1986 Saudi Arabia, for example, received the first AWACS plane. It is supposed to receive five such planes in all, and these are to be serviced by 500 American military and technical specialists. The Reagan Administration simultaneously resumed its efforts to gain congressional approval of the sale of 354 million dollars' worth of Stinger and Sidewinder missiles to Saudi Arabia. The missiles were promised to this country earlier, but were never delivered because of the opposition of the Zionist lobby.

In general, Washington sees the war in the Persian Gulf as a convenient pretext for "a broader range of U.S. activity in the Middle East." On this pretext, it is stepping up its own militarist preparations in this region and the Indian Ocean and intensifying its penetration of the Middle Eastern countries. The adverse effects of the Iran-Iraq war on the stability of these countries, especially if Iran should win, are becoming a recurring theme in American propaganda. "The Ayatollah Khomeini's forces have invaded Iraq," warned TIME magazine, the popular American weekly, back in July 1982, "and are threatening the entire Arab world."⁵ There was the obvious expectation that the seeds of this propaganda would land on fertile soil in some Arab countries with monarchic regimes, where the rulers are justifiably worried about the possibility of a revolutionary situation. One of the main reasons Washington suggested the existence of an "Iranian threat" to them was its hope of stepping up the creation of new pro-American alliances of various types in the Middle East.

The U.S. propaganda machine simultaneously took every opportunity to create difficulties in Soviet relations with Arab countries. To this end, it spread the rumor that the USSR was allegedly only "trying to maintain the semblance of neutrality" in the Iran-Iraq war while "running with the hare and hunting with the hounds"--in other words, while offering military assistance to Iran and to Iraq.

It is indicative that these accusations were made at the time when American weapons were entering Iran in huge quantities in spite of the official embargo. "American military hardware worth hundreds of millions of dollars is transferred to Iran each year," TIME reported back in 1983. "The suppliers include at least 10 American companies, as well as international arms dealers operating in the United States. Besides this, many of the American weapons are sold legally to such allies as South Korea and Israel, which then resell them to Iran." Recalling that American arms were being shipped to Iran even when 52 Americans were being held hostage, the weekly went on to say: "The arms trade with Iran is not just a rumor. TIME has hundreds of documents to prove...that engines for tanks and spare parts for fighter planes were sent from the United States to Iran through Canada and England."⁶

In 1983, however, the Washington administration, after repeatedly declaring that the United States was strictly neutral in the Iran-Iraq war and was taking the most vigorous steps to prevent shipments of American arms to the warring sides even through third countries, was able to suppress the imminent exposure of its actual provocative position in the Iran-Iraq conflict. This made the report in THE NEW YORK TIMES at the beginning of November 1986, exposing Washington's twofaced behavior, all the more sensational. It turned out that in July 1985 President Reagan had personally approved secret contacts with the Iranian leadership, which had publicly accused Washington of terrorism, with the alleged aim of seeking its assistance in the release of American hostages. What is more, this was followed by a decision on secret shipments of American weapons and spare parts to Iran through Israel.⁷ According to reports in the world press, spare parts for planes, tanks, and radar equipment were shipped to Iran not only through Israel, but also directly from U.S. bases in the Philippines on C-130 planes.

Another case of twofaced behavior on the part of the administration came to light when it was revealed that American intelligence services had been supplying both Iran and Iraq with deliberately false information in recent years, as THE NEW YORK TIMES reported on 12 January. Citing informed sources, the newspaper remarked that "some of the information supplied to Iraq was distorted expressly for the purpose of misleading it or leaving it in the dark."

Even American congressmen who would seem to have seen it all, including Republicans, could not conceal their indignation at the administration's actions, which they described with complete justification as something undermining trust in official policy.

The United States' supporters in the Arab world also began doubting the advisability of believing statements from Washington. All of this will have the most direct effect on U.S. access to military installations in the Arab countries.

People in the United States apparently realized that the official and open use of these installations is now fairly unlikely, because even the abrupt escalation of tension in the Persian Gulf did not convince these countries of the need to turn their military installations over to the American RDF. The leaders of virtually all Arab countries having agreements with Washington on military bases and privileges (Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Oman, and Somalia) are refusing to turn these bases over to the Americans. At the same time, however, the fear of losing Washington's military and economic assistance keeps these regimes from refusing it the right to use their military installations. The American-Egyptian talks on the Ras Banas base are indicative. During the initial stage in 1981, the U.S. Defense Department planned to spend over 400 million dollars to modernize the base in the expectation that it would be completely at the disposal of the RSF. Egypt would not agree to this, and Washington cut the projected sum to less than one-fifth of the original figure. The Egyptians would not agree to this either, however, because they do not want this kind of integration with Washington. A new compromise plan, stipulating that the United States and Egypt would allocate 50 million dollars each for the modernization of the base, also turned out to

be unacceptable to the Egyptian leadership: It would be too clear a demonstration of alliance with American imperialism. Nevertheless, Egypt did not officially denounce the agreement with the Americans on this base and has not made any final decisions yet.

After investing huge sums, although less than originally planned, in the modernization of military installations in the Arab countries, Washington is now officially confining itself in most cases to the storage of combat equipment there that might be used in times of crisis. American military subunits, described by different sources as numbering from 800 to 1,200 men, were secretly sent to the Arab countries to guard this equipment.

The issue of military bases in Arab countries was also complicated for the Pentagon when the gradual curtailment of military cooperation with Arab countries began to be proposed in earnest in the American Congress. Some legislators are saying that because the policy of many pro-Western Arab regimes "does little to promote American values in the region" and because they are not officially turning over their military bases to the United States or displaying any particular desire to oppose Libya, there is no need to maintain the high level of military-economic assistance to these countries. Transactions involving new arms shipments to Saudi Arabia and Jordan were effectively blocked in Congress. After Egyptian President Mubarak made anti-American statements in connection with the interception of the Egyptian airliner by American fighter planes, Congress considered cuts in military assistance to Egypt in fiscal year 1987.

The Pentagon is trying to make up for the restricted access to military bases in Arab countries by building up its own military potential in the region, including the reinforcement of the task forces of the 6th Fleet near the shores of Arab countries. Sometimes they can consist of up to three aircraft carrier forces, with almost 300 combat planes on board. Besides this, the Pentagon is striving for more active military cooperation with several non-Arab countries, especially Pakistan, where it hopes to gain access to military installations (the bases in Gwadar, Peshawar and, especially, Karachi). "The U.S. efforts to defend the Persian Gulf zone," American experts on Middle East affairs A. Cottrell and M. Moodie wrote in 1984, "and especially Saudi Arabia, must have the broadest possible geographic base. For this reason, the United States should give the possibility of privileges in Pakistan more serious consideration."⁸

The continued expansion of U.S. military cooperation with Israel, which has been traditionally viewed in Washington as the most reliable ally in the region, warrants special discussion. "The airing of dirty laundry" in connection with the exposure of Israeli spies in the United States (the case of J. Pollard and others) and the reciprocal Israeli accusations regarding the infiltration of Israeli organizations by American agents did not have any effect on this process. The amount of American military assistance to Tel Aviv is clearly increasing. Furthermore, loans are being replaced by subsidies. In other words, the United States is effectively taking on the responsibility of maintaining the Israeli military machine.

On 6 May 1986 the two countries signed a "memorandum on mutual understanding" in Washington within the framework of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI). By signing this document, Israel became the third state (after England and the FRG) to agree to take part in the Star Wars project. This is not surprising. Israel has been receiving intelligence information about its Arab neighbors from American satellites for a long time, using its own technical means for this purpose. By participating in the SDI, Tel Aviv hopes to gain access to the latest technology and use it to develop its own combat systems. Israel is known to be working on the development of laser and directed-energy weapons.

The United States invested 1.2 billion dollars in the development of the multipurpose Levi fighter plane, which was ceremoniously displayed at Ben-Gurion Airport on 21 July 1986. The American Pratt and Whitney firm supplied the engines for the planes. Political groups in Israel regard this plane as an important milestone in the improvement of their equipment and technology and as a symbol of their close relationship with the United States.

Plans also call for fundamentally new forms of military cooperation between Washington and Tel Aviv, to the point of the official use of military bases in Israel by the United States and the deployment of Pershing missiles there. Joint American-Israeli maneuvers and military exercises of various types have been conducted more frequently in the last 2 years. For example, the methods of "blitzkrieg" were perfected during maneuvers in the Negev Desert. Exercises of this kind close to the Egyptian border are seen by some Arab observers as clear proof of U.S. and Israeli attempts to exert pressure on Egypt to force it to submit more freely to Pentagon requests.

Washington has been making extensive use of various "threats" to justify the buildup of its own military presence in the region. It has inspired at least seven anti-Libyan campaigns in just the last 3 years and has tried to involve neighboring countries in them--Egypt, Sudan, and Tunisia. The Reagan Administration is making use of the events in and around Afghanistan to impose the hackneyed thesis of the "Soviet military threat" to the region on the Arab countries.

Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger has been particularly zealous in making these allegations. For example, he made some well-publicized remarks to the effect that when the Russians experience an oil shortage, they will be "strongly tempted" to move their troops "along the historical invasion routes" through Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq to the oilfields in the Persian Gulf zone. Weinberger asserts that the Soviet Union's efforts to control Middle East oil will be motivated not only by "economic necessity" but also by "Moscow's long-range goal of cutting the West off from this oil."⁹

At the same time, the intelligence agency of the U.S. Defense Department--that is, an agency directly under the jurisdiction of C. Weinberger--concluded in one of its reports that Soviet energy prospects appear "quite good," and the deputy director of this agency, Maj Gen R. Larkin, informed the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress that the Soviet Union had the "potential" for expanded oil production in the 1990's.¹⁰

"If Weinberger does not know anything about the forecasts of the Defense Intelligence Agency," former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs C. Van Hollen remarked with sarcasm in a NEW YORK TIMES article, "he obviously does not notice the absence of logic in his own arguments and his own unconvincing ideas about history.... Even his most zealous admirers among historians and archaeologists would have a hard time finding the 'historical invasion routes' he mentioned, leading from Soviet Central Asia to oilfields in Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia."¹¹

Nevertheless, Washington is trying to put this wholly fabricated "Soviet threat" to the Middle East at the basis of the propaganda disinformation it is spreading all over the Middle East and the rest of the world.

While Washington has been intensifying this anti-Soviet campaign, it has ostentatiously refused to consider the serious compromise proposals and actions of the USSR and the DRA. For example, literally within a week after General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev's statement in Vladivostok about the withdrawal of six Soviet regiments and their equipment and arms from Afghanistan, General G. Crist, the man in charge of planning the combat operations of the American RDF in the Middle East, said that "the Soviet Union now has the military capability to move south, into the Indian Ocean region, and the ability to circumvent any U.S. attempts to stop this."¹²

The campaign did not stop even after the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Revolutionary Council and Government of the DRA, guided by the highest public interest and concern for the preservation of life on Afghan land, addressed all Afghans with an appeal for the negotiation of national conciliation and solemnly declared their willingness to establish a national unity government, even if this should entail a coalition government consisting of representatives of broad political forces.

Debates on the Future Role of the RDF

The latest changes in regional affairs have also been reflected in the thinking of American military strategists. The issue of the primary target of the "rapid deployment forces" is now being hotly debated in Washington. At first the Reagan Administration believed that the RDF should be prepared primarily for combat operations against Soviet armed forces allegedly posing a threat to regions declared "vitally important" to the United States by Washington, particularly the Persian Gulf zone (the champion of this idea is C. Weinberger). "Current government strategy presupposes," the Pentagon chief said in 1981, "the ability of American forces to fight armed battles with the Russians in any part of the world."¹³ To this end, the administration approved a plan to increase the "rapid deployment forces" to 250,000 men and gave them additional technical means by putting them under the jurisdiction of the new Central Command.

Two basic points of view regarding the further improvement of the RDF then began to take shape. The first is still being defended by C. Weinberger to some extent. This is the idea of the "big RDF," envisaging the augmentation of their number to 450,000 men, or 21 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine combat units, their provision with the latest weapons and more technical equipment,

the expansion of the through capacity of the sea and air bridges across the Atlantic, and the improved scheduling of the transfer of forces, which should, ideally, be completed within a month. The Pentagon has already compiled lists of merchant fleet ships and civilian aircraft that might be needed by the RDF command to transfer this huge interventionist corps to the Middle East. The supporters of the "big RDF" believe that the preliminary storage of equipment will be of great importance to this operation, and the military bases and depots in the region are therefore of special significance.¹⁴

Another point of view is that of some members of the administration and the scientific community who support the idea of the "small RDF." They base their arguments on the assumption that the deployment of the RDF in the Middle East on a broad scale will entail substantial intergovernmental and technical difficulties. The deployment of a single Marine division will take at least 2 weeks, and the deployment of all forces will take an incomparably longer period of time. Under these conditions, "counteracting the Russians" is out of the question because the RDF would either suffer a relatively quick defeat, even before all the forces had been deployed, or would have to use nuclear weapons to prevent this. "We must admit," American political scientist R. Tucker wrote, for example, "that we cannot oppose the Russians in the Persian Gulf zone now, in the next few years, or ever."¹⁵ And former Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger said from the very beginning that the RDF was "not rapid, hard to deploy, and not even a force."¹⁶

In the opinion of the supporters of the "small RDF," the United States is more likely to have to deal with antigovernment riots or popular uprisings in the Middle Eastern countries, during the course of which "the possibility of the seizure of Persian Gulf oilfields for the purpose of future blackmail cannot be excluded." Consequently, they conclude, the RDF must be highly flexible and RDF personnel must be given special training for punitive (counterinsurgency) operations. They propose that the RDF be reduced to around 11 combat units, or 160,000 men, and have even proposed larger reductions. One of their arguments is that the reduction of the present force could produce a savings of 11 billion dollars, whereas the creation of the "big RDF" will require around 45 billion additional dollars.¹⁷

Two options have been proposed as a cover for counterinsurgency operations: horizontal escalation--that is, the threat of a conventional strike against the socialist countries in Europe and in other parts of the world or against the Far Eastern regions of the USSR--or vertical escalation--that is, the threat to use nuclear weapons.¹⁸

Judging by all indications, the administration has not made any final decision on the future of the RDF and is presently adhering to a compromise decision by maintaining the current "medium-sized RDF," consisting of 15 combat units and two separate forces. The American leadership's latest moves to unify all "commando" subunits under a single command and to create five light divisions and purchase 500 light tanks for the RDF, however, provide some indication that Washington is leaning toward the enhancement of the flexibility of its punitive forces.

Besides this, the theory of "low-intensity conflicts"--that is, quick counter-insurgency operations like the one in Grenada--is being elaborated by the U.S. military establishment. In particular, C. Weinberger himself now asserts that "the low-level military conflict will probably remain the most direct threat to the security of the free world until the end of this century."¹⁹ The theory of "low-intensity conflicts" is aimed at the development of the best way of using military strength against objectionable governments and movements. It should also prepare American public opinion for U.S. military actions in the region by promising quick armed intervention without any costly and bloody wars like the one in Vietnam and without the danger of vertical or horizontal escalation.

In any case, the Pentagon leadership still assigns priority to RDF exercises and maneuvers in the region, including joint maneuvers with the armed forces of some Arab states, during which scenarios of direct American armed intervention in the affairs of Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries are tested. For example, the possibility of using strategic B-52 bombers to bomb Libya was debated in the U.S. military establishment after the operation had been perfected during the Bright Star exercises in Egypt.

Deadlocks of Militarist Policy

Exercises of this kind are increasingly likely to entail substantial difficulties for the Pentagon, which might seem purely technical on the surface but actually have underlying political causes. For example, until recently Washington had an agreement on annual exercises of the Bright Star type with the capitals of some Arab states, but this agreement is now virtually meaningless. Now each new set of maneuvers involves a lengthy negotiation process, during which Washington sometimes openly exerts pressure on its Arab partners, for which the maneuvers are becoming a burden because they are increasingly likely to arouse anti-American or even anti-governmental feelings in the population. For example, the Pentagon could not convince its Egyptian colleagues to conduct the Bright Star exercises in 1986. Naval maneuvers by the two countries near the Egyptian coastline were held instead, and the United States had to give up its plan for an amphibious landing operation near the Egyptian Pyramids of Giza.

The plan to establish a pro-Western militarist bloc in the region has apparently been shelved by the United States, but not abandoned completely. At this point Washington seems to be more interested in forming a Cairo-Amman axis and in then attaching Saudi Arabia and other members of the Persian Gulf Cooperative Council to it.

In general, we can say that the more vigorous political and military activity of the United States in the Middle East in the 1980's did not have the results anticipated in Washington. On the contrary, Washington policy helped to reinforce skeptical feelings about the United States even in pro-Western and pro-American groups. The Reagan Administration has still been unable to attain a single one of the primary objectives of its military activity in the Middle East. Furthermore, there has been obvious regression, by Washington's own admission, in several areas. There have been difficulties, for example, in

gaining access to military installations in Arab countries. No country has been willing to openly and officially turn its bases over to the United States. Although some of these countries want to retain American politico-military support and economic assistance and have therefore not refused American armed forces purely nominal access to their bases, Washington could hardly be satisfied with the present situation. Furthermore, conservative Arab groups did not accept the idea of a "strategic consensus" on an anti-Soviet basis, primarily because of the continuing deep-seated Arab-Israeli conflicts and serious differences of opinion with regard to the so-called "Soviet threat."

Washington's attempts to change developmental trends in the region by a show of its "military strength and determination" have not produced the necessary results either. The United States was unable to dislodge the regime it disapproves of in Libya. On the contrary, its unconcealed military pressure and aggressive actions against this country increased the support for Libya in the Arab countries and in the Third World in general. Besides this, the White House's intentions to involve the West European allies in the anti-Libyan campaign created additional difficulties in U.S. relations with them.

Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration has no intention, judging by its actions, of making any substantial changes in its strategic aims or of restraining its militarist activity. What is more, published excerpts from a secret Pentagon document defining U.S. military strategy for fiscal years 1984-1988 frankly state that "the strategy for Southwest Asia (that is, the Middle East--Author), including the Persian Gulf, directs American armed forces to be prepared to take positions in this region when necessary ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE (emphasis ours--Author), without waiting for an invitation from a friendly government."²⁰ Therefore, the Pentagon is now prepared to go even further than it did 30 years ago, when the notorious "Eisenhower doctrine" was announced in March 1957 and stipulated that U.S. military intervention in the region had to be in response to a request, even a carefully engineered one, from a local government.

By openly announcing this kind of provocative and aggressive doctrine, Washington is putting a "time bomb" under the most explosive part of the world. The avoidance of surprises of global scales with unpredictable results will necessitate the collective efforts of all states--large and small, capitalist and socialist--to prevent conflicts, and these efforts are probably most necessary in the Middle East.

The USSR has always proposed radical measures to improve the atmosphere, in contrast to the aggressive U.S. line in the region, and this was reaffirmed by the proposals M.S. Gorbachev made during his talks with Indian leaders in November 1986. In particular, M.S. Gorbachev reaffirmed our country's willingness to take part in multilateral talks by all states using the waters of the Indian Ocean with the aim of guaranteeing the security of sea lanes, including the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca, and guaranteeing the sovereignty of littoral countries over their natural resources.²¹

The implementation of these proposals, aimed at regulating Middle Eastern affairs, would do much to solve the problems of this long-suffering region.

FOOTNOTES

1. In accordance with the extremely popular view in the United States, the authors use the term Middle East to signify the region stretching from Afghanistan in the east to Morocco and Mauritania in the west and from Turkey in the north to Somalia and Sudan in the south.
2. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 June 1985.
3. For a more detailed discussion, see SSHA: EPI, 1986, No 7, pp 27-38--Ed.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 18 April 1986.
5. TIME, 26 July 1982, p 6.
6. Ibid., 25 July 1983, p 26.
7. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9 November 1986.
8. A. Cottrell and M. Moodie, "The United States and the Persian Gulf. Past Mistakes, Present Needs," New Brunswick (N.J.), 1984, p 25.
9. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 4 October 1981.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. SUN, 5 August 1986.
13. THE WASHINGTON POST, 7 September 1981.
14. "Rapid Deployment Forces: Policy and Budgetary Implications," Wash., 1983, pp 37-38.
15. R. Tucker, "The Purpose of American Power. An Essay on National Security," N.Y., 1981, p 97.
16. THE WASHINGTON POST, 24 September 1980.
17. "Rapid Deployment Forces," p XVI.
18. T. McNaugher, "Arms and Oil. U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf," Wash., 1985, p 19.
19. THE NATION, 4 January 1986.
20. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 May 1982.
21. PRAVDA, 28 November 1986.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1987

RIGHT EXTREMIST TERROR UNDER COVER OF 'DEMOCRACY'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87
(signed to press 13 Mar 87) pp 25-34

[Article by V.A. Vlasikhin and S.A. Chervonnaya]

[Text] Last summer the small town of Hayden Lake (Idaho) turned into an armed camp for 3 days. Its streets were flooded with somber individuals dressed in special uniforms and armed with modern automatic weapons. The white robes of the Ku Klux Klan and hands jerking up in a fascist salute could be seen here and there in the crowd. The gates of one estate were decorated with a white sheet depicting a swastika crossed by a sword; burly men carrying machine guns guarded the gates. The gathering of neo-Nazis here was called the "Aryan Nations Congress." "Turn the northwestern states into a white stronghold!" and "Declare war on Jews, blacks, and all non-Christians!"--these were the appeals of the mob gathered here.

The perceptible increase in activity by all kinds of rightwing extremist terrorist organizations and groups is a sinister development in American politics of the mid-1980's. The main reason for this is the ideological atmosphere created by the current administration in Washington. From the very beginning, it has tried to eviscerate the democratic rights and freedoms of citizens, has led an attack on the socioeconomic and political gains of black Americans, and has vigorously cultivated the spirit of ultra-conservatism and chauvinism. All of this has led to changes in domestic politics. In particular, as American political scientist R. Dallek says, the country has become "more receptive to the conservative ideology,"¹ and this is giving ultra-rightwing forces even more opportunity for action.

Rightwing extremist and racist elements have felt freer in this atmosphere. It has not only reinforced the traditional "hate groups"--the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazi Party--but has also led to the birth and propagation of many new rightwing extremist organizations and groups since the beginning of the 1980's. In an article in U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, American sociologist W. Reese remarked that "fanatics on the right feel that the time has come to take the offensive."²

Of course, the obviously undemocratic tendencies in White House policy are not the only reason for the increased activity and flourishing of rightwing

extremist organizations. Rightwing extremism is the product of the entire historical heritage of the United States, the political and legal traditions and institutions of the American bourgeois society.

Let us begin with the fact that rightwing extremist organizations validate their existence by invoking the constitutionally secured freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, and association. The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States does stipulate that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." This is a terse statement, but it does seem to categorically prohibit any restriction on any statement. The only provision in the first amendment with regard to the right of assembly is that citizens must assemble "peaceably."

Nevertheless, neither in constitutional theory nor in the practice of constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court has anyone even imagined that the authors of the Bill of Rights (the first 10 amendments) wanted to consciously perpetuate certain "absolute" and unlimited freedoms that would allow the young republic to be destroyed by its potential enemies. As American expert on public administration L. Levi points out, when these authors formulated the statement about freedom of speech, "they did not say what they meant and they did not mean what they said."³ In any case, the "founding fathers" certainly were not inclined to forge weapons against the bases of the American bourgeois system of government.

The terse wording of the first amendment was therefore left open by the authors of the Bill of Rights to clarification in constitutional theory and government practice.

In fact, throughout its history, the American bourgeois government has not regarded the first amendment as an absolute ban on the restriction of political freedoms: Both the U.S. Congress and state governments have passed laws limiting the free expression of opinions and regulating the functioning of the mass media and of political associations and the conduct of rallies, meetings, and demonstrations. People and organizations regarded as politically undesirable by U.S. ruling circles have always been subject to the most stringent legislative restrictions. The history of the "exercise" of the first amendment includes the persecution of labor organizations, the repression of communists, and the harassment of activists in the struggle for the civil rights of black and native Americans and in the peace movement. Certain pejorative labels are present in the files on all these "cases": "subversive elements," "terrorists," "disturbers of the peace," "instigators," etc. People have been tried for political convictions objectionable to the capitalist government or for political activities arousing the suspicions of the authorities. The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, assembly, and association have taken a back seat to the priorities of the punitive policies of the ruling class.

At the same time, even an expert on American history would have difficulty recalling any well-publicized trials in which the accused were real terrorists,

murderers, and rapists--members of the Ku Klux Klan, Nazis, and members of racist and extremist organizations and groups. Their genuine subversive activity has never upset the authorities much, the bourgeois courts have shown them mercy, and the few isolated police actions to put an end to "excesses" in the activities of rightwing extremists have been largely symbolic. The extremists therefore have good reason to demagogically invoke the first amendment in defense of the legality of their organizations. It effectively protects the radical extremist organizations on the right, and these are needed by ruling circles as a constant means of exerting pressure on leftist forces in society, as a nutritive medium for "alternative" bourgeois democratic structures, and as a means of intimidating the public.

In this context, the position of the conservative elite is quite specific and understandable because it is dictated by its class essence. But it is a paradox that "constitutional protection" is often extended eagerly to the rightwing extremists by those at the opposite end of the spectrum of bourgeois ideology--by liberals.

The prevailing interpretation of the freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly in the constitutional theory of political freedoms in the United States is the bourgeois liberal interpretation based on the idea of the supra-class, neutral nature of the constitution, extending equal political freedom to all citizens, regardless of their political convictions. A statement by Professor T. Emerson, the well-known American theorist of constitutional law, is typical in this respect: "The prevailing point of view today is that freedom of expression must be guaranteed to all groups, even those seeking to destroy it. This is the only consistent approach in light of the bases of the theory of political freedoms."⁴

This bourgeois liberal reading of the constitution is completely acceptable to the capitalist government because it allows it to play the role of a "class-neutral" guarantor of political freedoms. It is not surprising that many of the prevailing liberal arguments, concepts, and ideas in constitutional theory are eagerly taken up by official propaganda and by official ideologists. And it goes without saying that the liberal interpretation of the freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly as some kind of "absolutes" evokes positive responses on the right flank of bourgeois political thinking--in the conservative camp. As a result, rightwing radicals have often had to refer to documents and principles constituting the political-theoretical foundation of American liberalism for demagogic purposes in their own political interest. The opponents of the genuine democratic ideals and values of the American people use these principles as a cover in their attempts to rescind and destroy these freedoms.

People who care about the ideals of genuine democracy are distinguished by a different approach to this matter. Democracy has the right to protect itself by keeping terrorists of various types, neo-Nazis, and other adversaries off the political stage. It is understandable that communists and progressive people insist on the complete prohibition of the activities of the undemocratic "hate groups." The new program of the Communist Party, USA, says that under socialism there would be a ban on "the preaching of racism, chauvinism,

anti-Semitism, and religious or ethnic hatred, and appeals for war or violence."⁵ Leftist radical American author R. Davis remarked in an article in THE PROGRESSIVE: "The Ku Klux Klan must be stopped.... If you believe that the elimination of racism is a higher priority than the worship of the legal fiction of 'freedom of speech,' then you understand the problem.... A society despising racism would not allow it to flourish and, in particular, would not let the shock troops of racism act with the official consent of the authorities and under police protection. The fact that our society officially consents to this activity testifies that we will resort to any means, even the transparent first amendment fetish, to keep racism alive."⁶

Some liberals regard the attempts of progressive Americans to impose a legal ban on the activities of the obscurantists from the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazi Party as "totalitarian infringements" upon the sacred principle of American constitutionality. The initial premise of the liberal, presupposing the granting of freedom of expression to all without exception, is the notion of the notorious "free marketplace of ideas," where they compete and the "reasonable" ideas allegedly always win. According to the liberal's logic, if a government is allowed to keep certain "unpopular" ideas out of this marketplace, it will then be free to keep out any other ideas objectionable to it. "If any one group is denied the most fundamental of all freedoms..., no group will be exempt from the same treatment,"⁷ American journalist N. Hentoff explained in response to R. Davis' article.

Bourgeois liberals have even gone so far as to ask whether the rightwing extremists are as frightening as those who want to limit their freedom of expression. Why? These limits allegedly "play into the hands" of extremist groups on the right. Besides this, they say that this practice would open the door for subsequent prohibitions, because the temptation is strong, it is hard to stop, and where should the line be drawn? As if democrats have any adversaries more dangerous than fascism and ultra-rightwing terror!

The formal logical constructs of those who adhere to bourgeois liberal constitutionality "on principle" and who take their apologies for political freedoms in the capitalist society to absurd lengths are actually helping the American Government cultivate racism in the society, an indulgent attitude toward extremism "on the right," and intolerance for political radicalism "on the left."

Of course, liberal thinking in itself does not accept the ideology of racism, fascism, and anti-Semitism preached by rightwing extremist elements and is eager to discredit it, but bourgeois liberals are willing to extend complete "constitutional protection" to the ideology they condemn, and they extend it in theory and in practice. For example, when the U.S. Supreme Court was inclined to give the constitution a liberal interpretation in the 1960's under the chairmanship of E. Warren, it recognized the right of the Ku Klux Klan to freely advocate racist and undemocratic ideas in its decision in *Brandenburg v. Ohio* (1969) on the basis of the first amendment. The standards set by this precedent have entered all of the lawbooks and have become a legal shield protecting extremist groups on the right.

Here is another example. The largest bourgeois liberal organization engaged in the protection of constitutional rights in the United States, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), constantly offers legal services to members of the Ku Klux Klan and Nazis to guard their activities against judicial or administrative restrictions. The politically absurd--from the standpoint of the ACLU's general ideological tenets--practice of defending inveterate opponents of civil liberties is rationalized with the abovementioned formal logic of liberal theoretical arguments about freedom of speech, assembly, and association. For example, the historic case connected with the anti-Nazi position of the authorities in Skokie (Illinois) was decided in favor of the American Nazis with the aid of lawyers from the ACLU at the end of the 1970's. This case, which acquired all the features of a scandal, came about in the following manner.

In spring 1977 the Chicago organization of the National Socialist Party decided to hold some organized marches by its members on the streets of the small town of Skokie; the town is inhabited primarily by Jews, many of whom came here from Europe after experiencing the horrors of Hitlerism. The Chicago Nazis decided to march in paramilitary uniforms, with swastika armbands and flags and with fascist slogans. Under pressure from angry citizens, the municipal government of Skokie published an ordinance effectively prohibiting the demonstration. It was appealed in a local court by the Nazis' lawyers on the grounds that the ordinance would prevent the exercise of the freedom of expression guaranteed to all citizens by the first amendment to the constitution. City officials argued that their prohibition was necessary because the inhabitants of Skokie were planning a large counterdemonstration, and that this could make the situation uncontrollable and lead to violent confrontations. The ACLU lawyers responded with the declaration that the authorities would then need to take measures against the participants in the counterdemonstration and even prohibit it, and "if additional police should be needed to maintain order, they should be recruited to guard demonstrations by citizens, even if the citizens are Nazis."⁸

A lawsuit began over the constitutionality of the fascist provocations. It moved from state courts to federal courts, and the final decision was that the public dissemination of "doctrines of racial and religious hatred" is fully within the permissible limits of the freedom of expression guaranteed in the first amendment; the Skokie ordinance was declared unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court turned down the municipal government's appeal, leaving the decision of the lower courts in force. The cause of the American Nazis turned out to be "just" on the strength of the energetic defense of their "constitutionally protected freedoms" by liberals from the ACLU.

This is how the legal bases of "inside-out democracy" are established, effectively granting a free hand to thugs from the Ku Klux Klan, Nazis, and other rightwing extremist elements.

But it is not only in bourgeois liberal judicial verdicts that rightwing extremist elements find support. Racism in all of its forms, covert and overt, still exists in the American society and serves as a nutritive medium for rightwing extremism. "In the United States the racism directed against black

Americans has deep roots and obvious, scandalous, and destructive effects.... Other ugly forms of racism and chauvinism, such as the displays of chauvinism and discrimination against Mexican-Americans, are nurtured by the same source, which carries this sickness to all parts of our nation like a sewer,"⁹ said General Secretary Gus Hall of the Communist Party, USA.

Racism, the contempt or outright hatred for racial and ethnic minorities, is still an informal component of the American political culture. Of course, the constitutional amendments of the 19th century about the equality of blacks and whites, the civil rights laws of the stormy 1960's, and the bold anti-segregation decisions of the liberal Supreme Court headed by E. Warren erected judicial barriers to impede the practice of racial discrimination, but no one prohibited the activities of the obscurantists from the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazi Party. Their right to openly preach the idea of white supremacy and to fuel hatred for people of color and Jews is protected by an entire code of legal interpretations of the first amendment. We should recall that the United States did not ratify the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination.

In today's American society the inner prejudices against racial and ethnic minorities do not necessarily lead to openly racist behavior and actions, but they are a salient feature of the American political culture. "A recent study of the mental attitudes of American teenagers revealed," American political scientist R. Merellman reported, "the existence of strong anti-Semitic and anti-black attitudes even among children from wealthy and educated families--that is, among those who are most likely to hear arguments against racial prejudice."¹⁰

Legislative reforms can undermine the legal basis of racial discrimination, but they cannot destroy mental attitudes. The racial prejudices and ethnic snobbery of the white Anglo-Saxon, nurtured by decades of American history, extend to black citizens and to immigrants from Latin America and Asia and to Jews. In reference to the latter, R. Merellman remarks that "Jews have still not been completely accepted in American society.... Until recently they suffered from discrimination in hiring and from various kinds of 'restriction,' as the informal prohibition against Jews in certain select residential neighborhoods is called."¹¹ What is more, in the years since this work was published, signs of anti-Semitism in the society have only grown stronger.

"Today we are witnessing a new and stronger form of racism in our nation. It is apparent in the way in which many now feel justified in treating blacks and members of other minorities,"¹² H. Washington, the black congressman who was later elected mayor of Chicago, said in congressional hearings in 1982. One of the reports of the oldest black organization, the National Urban League, says that "racism is being legalized again in America today. There is a direct connection between the enlightened citizens who feel justified in making insulting remarks about blacks and other racial groups and the primitive individuals who stoop to murder and terrorism. The only difference is in the degree of racism."¹³

It is significant that the United States is one of the few UN members to refuse for many years to take on any specific obligations in the struggle against

racial discrimination. It just recently ratified the international convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, and it refused to support the UN program for a decade of action against racism and racial discrimination (1973-1983). The United States is party to only 4 of the 19 fundamental international UN-sponsored agreements on human rights. The United States' stubborn resistance of UN efforts to combat racial discrimination was demonstrated when it ostentatiously refused to take part in the second world conference on the struggle against racism and racial discrimination in August 1983. As for the present Republican administration, it is taking every opportunity to limit the enforcement of earlier laws against discrimination and is complicating the work of agencies overseeing their enforcement.

All progressive forces in the United States were particularly alarmed by the sharp escalation of the persecution of elected black and Hispanic officials and of activists fighting for effective participation by racial and ethnic minorities in public administration. The purpose of this campaign is to impede the exercise of civil rights by minorities, especially the right to vote, deprive minorities of political representation, and intimidate elected representatives of minorities. The victims of this rightist campaign include Rudy Lozano, a union and political activist from Chicago who fought for the rights of the poor and of black and Hispanic Americans.

Rudy Lozano was born in 1951 into a large worker family of immigrants from Mexico and grew up in a Chicago neighborhood inhabited by poor Hispanics. While he was still in school, Lozano headed a campaign to stop discrimination against Hispanic students, and after he went on to college he became quite popular as an activist in the movement for the improvement of his people's status. Rudy Lozano and his comrades wanted to put an end to the authoritarian behavior of employers and to organize the underprivileged Mexican workers. He was one of the founders of the Universal Brotherhood of Workers, an organization established to defend Mexican migrant workers and to organize them in unions. Later, he founded the Independent Political Organization in West Chicago, uniting Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and blacks and promoting the election of progressive candidates for elected office. He was also active in the peace movement, was a member of the board of the U.S. Peace Council, and headed the Chicago committee for preparations for the march on Washington on 27 August 1983 under the slogan "For peace, freedom and social justice." Lozano was one of the recognized leaders of Hispanic Americans on the national level until the bullets of hired assassins put an end to the life of this remarkable man.

The political reasons for this crime were completely obvious, but the authorities falsely described it as an unmotivated act by a "lone killer." The National Alliance Against Racial and Political Repression described the refusal of investigative agencies to examine all of the evidence refuting the official story as part of the racists' attack on workers, black and Hispanic leaders, and progressive forces in general.

The Republican administration's assault on minority rights was interpreted by racist forces as a sign that they could freely treat blacks, other colored Americans, and Jews in any way they wished with impunity. There has been a

truly unprecedeted rise in anti-Semitism and an increase in outbursts of racial violence against black Americans and other minorities in the 1980's.

Many ultra-rightist groups which came into being in recent years are now operating along with the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazi Party. A list of them in TIME magazine in October 1986 included Aryan Nations, serving as a coordinating center for smaller groups, and Posse Comitatus, the Order, and the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord. The American press has also put the Christian Defense League, Christian Patriots Defense League, Ministers of the Church of Christ, White Patriot Party, and others in this category.¹⁴

The members of these organizations are frequently armed--with explosives, grenades, mortars, and automatic and semiautomatic weapons, have armored cars, and are trained in the methods of diversionary warfare. They are united by ideological intolerance, racism, violent anti-Semitism, and rabid anti-communism.

It is known, for example, that Posse Comitatus was founded in 1969 by a man named J. Wickstrom, who was a member of a pro-fascist group in the 1930's. The Posse Comitatus leadership organizes "partisan warfare seminars" in various parts of the United States, primarily in the west and midwest. A seminar in Kansas taught the techniques of killing, hand-to-hand combat, and poisoning. Another seminar in Colorado taught people how to build bombs. At a press conference in 1981 Wickstrom announced that the members of his organization were stockpiling weapons and had conducted "joint combat maneuvers" in California with members of the Ku Klux Klan and the Minutemen.¹⁵

In 1983 the groups calling themselves Aryan Nations, White American Fortress, and the Silent Brotherhood began arranging for attempts on the lives of members of the black and Jewish communities. Aryan Nations has established militarized camps for training in partisan warfare. The assassins of A. Berg, the commentator of a Jewish radio station in Denver (Colorado) who was known for his democratic views (Berg was killed by a blast from an automatic weapon in summer 1984), hid in one of these camps for several months. At the beginning of 1986 liberal attorney C. Goldmark, his wife, and his young son were savagely murdered in Seattle and another son was severely wounded. The killings took place a day after a local court convicted the members of the Order, a neo-Nazi group. The killer, a man named Rice, made no secret of the fact that the crime was motivated by revenge.

The scales of Ku Klux Klan activity are much greater than they were in the last decade, and the range of KKK victims is broader. Today the Klan does not confine itself to the persecution of southern blacks but is also active in the north and is terrorizing the Hispanic population of the southwestern states. The KKK establishes its groups in academic institutions, in enterprises, in the army, and even in prisons, publicly issues incendiary racist appeals, and encourages armed violence. Members of the Klan undergo military training in militarized camps and secret training centers in various states. The KKK "special forces" established in 1980 are armed for combat, conduct regular exercises, and learn the tactics of partisan warfare. Their commanders openly discuss the coming "race wars."

Membership in the KKK multiplied during the first 3 years of the Reagan Administration and it now has more than 50,000 members and over 100,000 "sympathizers." The KKK has expanded the geography of its criminal activity considerably. It is indicative that in March 1983 the members openly joined a march in Washington for the first time since 1925. In August 1985 thugs from the KKK held a demonstration in Rocky Ridge, Maryland, close to the American capital. The attempts of progressive organizations to ban the demonstration failed: The authorities again shut their eyes to the racist activity, not only allowing the racists to gather in Rocky Ridge but also providing them with police protection.

The activities of the KKK faction headed by Bill Wilkinson, called the Invisible Empire, also warrants mention. The United Klans of America, headed by Robert Shelton, committed outrageous acts for a long time in Decatur (Alabama). Local authorities did absolutely nothing while the racists fired on the homes of NAACP activists and launched a campaign for the persecution of black Americans.

In August 1985 the press reported from Alabama that the appellate court in this state had overturned the death sentence of KKK member Henry Hayes, who had committed outrages against black 19-year-old Michael Donald on 20 March 1981 in Mobile (Alabama) with an accomplice. Hayes and his fellow Klansman James Knowles tortured and killed the young man. That night Donald's bloody corpse was taken to a central street in Mobile by the Klansmen and was hanged from a tree. Under public pressure, the court sentenced Hayes to death and Knowles to life in prison, but the high priests of American justice used a legal loophole to overturn the decision.

There have been increasingly frequent bombings of the homes of blacks who have dared to move into white suburbs in the United States. Rightwing extremists picket schools, distribute vile propaganda materials to students, and sow racial hatred. To keep blacks out of certain occupations and unions and to fuel dissension in the working class, the racists launched a campaign of violence and threats at enterprises. On 1 August 1982 racists burned down the home of R. Woods, a black man who had moved with his family to a white neighborhood in Knoxville (Tennessee). On 23 November of the same year three KKK members broke into the Waco (Georgia) home of Peggy French, a white woman, and brutally beat her with leather belts in the presence of her small children for "being friendly to blacks." On 9 February 1983 the same three men and two other Klansmen broke into the Cokely home in Tallapoosa, Georgia, carrying guns and wearing masks, and gave Warren Cokely a vicious beating. He was "guilty" of having a white wife.

The tragic events in Philadelphia in May 1985, when barbarous outrages were committed against black inhabitants (a powerful bomb was dropped on a ghetto building from a police helicopter, 11 people burned to death, 60 buildings were burned to the ground, and hundreds of people were left homeless), literally shocked the world. The mayor of Philadelphia had to declare a state of emergency in the city's southwestern neighborhoods. When thugs marched along the streets of Philadelphia shouting obscene insults at blacks, throwing rocks, and firing guns, the racists were left alone, but when demonstrations against racism began, the police arrested 34 of the demonstrators.

There have been more frequent fires in recent years in the buildings of organizations advocating racial equality and defending the rights of black Americans. For example, a fire was set in the headquarters of Operation PUSH, headed by popular leader Jesse Jackson.

There are statutes against racist vandalism and intimidation in 29 states, but the authorities rarely react to criminal acts by KKK members. In 1984, for example, only 36 people were charged with acts of racist violence by the Department of Justice.

Anti-Semitism has been used by the U.S. ruling class for a long time to split the ranks of laborers of different religions, nationalities, and races. The new program of the Communist Party, USA, says that "anti-Semitic demagogic is the main weapon of reactionary and fascist movements and is intended to divert public anger at the ruling class and the capitalist system to the Jewish population."¹⁶

In 1984, 369 attacks on Jews or threats of attack (5.4 percent more than in 1983) and 715 acts of vandalism (7 percent more than the year before) were reported in the country.

The overwhelming majority of fascist thugs who are caught in the act are never penalized. A U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT article just before the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the defeat of fascist Germany remarked: "At a time when Americans are remembering the World War II Nazi prejudices which led to mass murder, a new wave of hatred is rising in their own country. The targets of this hatred are Jews, just as they were in Germany 40 years ago."¹⁷

The year of 1985 was also marked by new anti-Semitic attacks in New York, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. In November, for example, a group of unknown individuals organized a pogrom of stores belonging to Jews in Brooklyn, a New York neighborhood. According to police records, there are two anti-Semitic assaults on the average each day in the United States, and these usually end in the beating of the victims.

These statistics, however, are not a true reflection of the scales of anti-Semitism in the United States. According to reports in the press, for each reported outrage committed by neo-Nazis, racists, and religious fanatics, there are several cases which are not reported by the victims in the fear of reprisals.

As a rule, the police "do not manage" to find and arrest the persons guilty of anti-Semitic terrorist acts. The police try to pass off these incidents as ordinary hooliganism. As one U.S. Department of Justice official said in a public address, however, "cross burnings, intimidation, vandalism, and other signs of hatred cannot be blamed on teenagers who have had too much beer on a Saturday night. These crimes are planned in advance and are deliberately committed by people who hate Jews, Hispanics, blacks, Asian-Americans, and other minorities."¹⁸

The rebirth of racism, neo-Nazism, and rightwing extremism in recent years in the United States is quite symptomatic of American society in the 1980's.

The actually unimpeded activity of rightwing extremist organizations therefore represents the other side of the bourgeois liberal interpretation of the constitution. The logic of bourgeois democracy progresses from the unlimited freedom of misanthropic speech to the freedom to organize pogroms. The victims of this logic are the thousands of Americans suffering from the terrorist acts of rightwing extremists.

Rightwing extremism is not only an ominous reality of the present day; it is also something like a reserve of U.S. reactionary forces for further attacks on the democratic gains, political freedoms, and civil rights of the American people.

FOOTNOTES

1. R. Dallek, "Ronald Reagan. The Politics of Symbolism," Cambridge (Mass.), 1984, p 56.
2. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 6 May 1985, p 68.
3. Quoted in: F. Haiman, "Freedom of Speech," Skokie (Ill.), 1976, p XII.
4. T. Emerson, "Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment," N.Y., 1966, p 49.
5. Quoted in: SSHA: EPI, 1984, No 4, p 119.
6. THE PROGRESSIVE, July 1983, pp 22-23.
7. Ibid., p 24.
8. N. Hentoff, "The First Freedom. The Tumultuous History of Free Speech in America," N.Y., 1981, p 327.
9. Quoted in: I. Pavlov, "More bespraviya--Amerika. Kapitalizm SShA i diskriminatsiya lichnosti" [Sea of Injustice--America. U.S. Capitalism and Discrimination Against the Individual], Moscow, 1981, p 104.
10. P. Eisinger et al, "American Politics. The People and the Polity," Boston, 1978, p 269.
11. Ibid., p 273.
12. "Civil Liberties in Reagan's America. ACLU Report," N.Y., 1982, p 37.
13. "The State of Black America 1981," Wash., 1981, p VII.
14. TIME, 20 October 1986, p 74.
15. "Nasledniki Dzhozefa Makkartii" [Joseph McCarthy's Successors], edited by S.M. Plekhanov, Moscow, 1984, pp 110-115.

16. SSHA: EPI, 1983, No 2, p 127.
17. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 6 May 1985, p 68.
18. "Rising Tide of Racial Harrassment in America. Statement by Gilbert G. Pompa, Director, Community Relations Service, U.S. Department of Justice," Wash., 13 July 1981, p 10.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1987

8588
CSO: 1803/08

U.S. AND JAPANESE QUALITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87
(signed to press 13 Mar 87) pp 35-43

[First part of article by L.A. Konareva; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Production efficiency is still one of the central problems in the economies of the industrially developed capitalist countries. The main way of solving this problem consists in augmenting labor productivity by incorporating advanced technology and improving the **QUALITY** of the product. In connection with this, the combination of perceptible successes in Japanese economic development and the relatively weaker economic position of the United States in the capitalist world has aroused a great deal of American interest in the Japanese system of management.¹

At the beginning of the 1980's a Swiss organization, the European Management Forum, studied the competitive potential of the economies of 22 countries belonging to the OECD--that is, the actual and potential ability of companies to design, manufacture, and sell goods that are more appealing to consumers than the goods of competitors because of differences in prices and other indicators. Competitive potential was determined on the basis of 10 factors, and each of these was also determined on the basis of a group of criteria (245 in all). The main indicators were economic dynamics (rates of economic development, levels of industrial production, per capita output of the most important commodities, etc.--25 criteria in all), the effectiveness of industrial production, market dynamics (it was in this group that several non-price criteria were judged, including quality, design, level of post-sale service, etc.), the role of government, and national policy on innovations (the organization of R & D, the willingness of the government and of firm executives to implement new ideas and incorporate new items and technological processes). The results indicated that Japan invariably ranked highest in terms of competitive potential throughout the 1980-1982 period (the period covered by the research). Countries were rated on a point system, in which the country ranking highest in terms of all factors would have a rating of 100 percent. It is extremely indicative that Japan was given a rating of 99.9 percent and that the United States had a rating of 80.86 percent, ranking third after Switzerland (87.55 percent).² This suggests that the entire process of economic development in the 1970's was aimed at securing competitive potential to a greater extent in Japan than in the United States.

The successes of Japanese industry put this country in the category of world leaders in the production of several of the products of leading sectors. It ranks first in world shipbuilding, automobile manufacture, and the production of robots, high-grade steel, etc. Japan's share of U.S. imports of passenger cars has steadily held at 70 percent. Sales of 3.7 million Japanese automobiles in the United States are anticipated in 1987. This will be equivalent to a third of the entire sales volume, and if imports, joint production, and the purchase of Japanese parts and components are combined, according to Chairman Lee Iacocca of the board of directors of the Chrysler corporation, this year "50 percent of the American automobile business will be Japanese."³ The excess of U.S. imports from Japan over exports has been rising at a rate of 17 percent a year since 1970, creating a steady deficit in the balance of trade, which amounted to 50 billion dollars in 1985 and reached an estimated 70 billion in 1986.⁴ The structure of commodity exchange is also unfavorable for the United States. Around two-thirds of American exports to Japan are raw materials and semimanufactured goods, whereas more than 85 percent of Japanese exports to the United States are the finished products of the processing industry.⁵

When tendencies in the development of trade and economic competition between the United States and Japan are analyzed, it is important to remember that the United States is still the leader of the capitalist system in the main high technology industries and it was the first to have many of the discoveries and inventions that laid the basis for a qualitatively new level of scientific and technical development. Nevertheless, American businessmen and the U.S. Government are disturbed by the reduction of the technological gap between the United States and Japan and the quicker improvement of the quality of Japan's advanced high technology products, which was first apparent in consumer goods production and increased the deficit in the U.S. balance of trade with Japan. The United States is still the main exporter of many important types of manufactured goods to world markets (computers, the products of the aerospace and chemical industries, and military equipment). In the last decade, however, the U.S. share of such products as automobiles, cameras and movie cameras, stereophonic recorders and players, color TV sets, electronic components, medical equipment, optical instruments, and industrial robots has been reduced by 50 percent.⁶ In 1984 there was a deficit in the U.S. balance of trade in the goods of branches with highly developed technology for the first time. Now that Japan has assumed the leading position in the export of high technology consumer goods, it is vigorously penetrating the market for the means of production. It ranks highest among the countries exporting machine tools to the United States, and highly accurate and highly productive tools, particularly machining centers, have accounted for an increasing share of these exports.

We do not plan to analyze all of the causes and indicators of the changing balance of power between the United States and Japan in the world arena in this article, and will examine the role of only one factor in this process--product quality.

Product Quality--The Basis of Competitive Potential

Many studies have been conducted in recent years to learn the reasons for the high competitive potential of Japanese goods. Competitive potential, as we

said, depends on many factors, the significance of which varies depending on the conditions in a specific market at a specific time, but two of them--the price and the quality of products--have a decisive effect on the success of goods in the marketplace. The relatively low prices of Japanese goods were originally thought to be the main reason for their successful penetration of world markets. For a long time, the lower overhead costs at Japanese enterprises was a result of lower wages than in Western Europe and the United States. By the end of the 1970's, however, wages were comparatively equal, and according to some estimates the wages of Japanese workers in export industries were even slightly higher than wages in England and France.⁸ Labor productivity, which rose more quickly in Japan, has had a restraining effect on the rise in overhead costs due to the much more dramatic wage increases than in the United States. For example, it costs from 1,500 to 2,000 dollars to produce a single automobile in Japan--that is, around 20 percent less than in the United States--and half of the difference is due to the difference in hourly wages (10 dollars in Japan and 18.5 dollars in the United States), while the other half is due to the fact that labor productivity in the automobile industry in Japan is from 2 to 2.5 times as high as in the United States and Western Europe. The situation in the electronics industry is the same.⁹

In spite of the lower overhead costs, the difference in the prices of Japan's main export goods has become negligible, but export volume has continued to grow. What is more, the ability of the Japanese to manufacture cheaper and better goods is having a significant effect on price competition. For this reason, economists and experts on management are now concentrating on another factor securing competitive potential--the high quality of products. D. Vogel, an instructor in the School of Business Administration of a university in Berkeley, said that "the difference in the quality of American and Japanese products has become absolutely obvious in the last decade (he is referring to the 1970's--L.K.). American consumers still prefer to buy Japanese goods even though the price advantage has virtually disappeared."¹⁰ It must be said that leading experts on quality control in the United States, especially J. Juran, who has analyzed the processes taking place in Japan, predicted the current situation long ago. Here is a prediction Juran made in 1966: "When we look at the higher rates of development in Japan and compare them to the moderate progress in other countries, we arrive at the inescapable conclusion that Japan is moving toward world leadership in the sphere of product quality and will achieve this status within two decades because no one else is moving at the same speed."¹¹

According to Juran's definition, there was a "revolution" in quality in Japan in the postwar years. At one time the trademark "Made in Japan" was an indication of second-rate goods of poor quality. Today many comparative evaluations attest to the superior quality of Japanese goods.

For example, the Japanese automobile breaks down only one-tenth as often as the average American automobile. A maintenance contract on a Japanese automobile costs less than half as much as an American warranty and lasts longer. At the end of the 1970's the rate of operational failures in American TV sets was 5 to 6 times as high as the rate for Japanese sets, but later the difference decreased to 1.5 times. It is true that this did not have a significant

effect on consumer attitudes, which have turned out to be quite stable. It takes a long time to regain the allegiance of consumers once it has been lost. Although some American companies producing television sets realized the danger of foreign competition, took several purposeful steps, and designed models guaranteed to work for 40 years by the end of 1982, the situation in the marketplace did not change: Customers still prefer to buy Japanese TV sets because they are now confident of their superior quality.

The average operating time of the Japanese Ricoh duplicating machine is from 1.5 to 3 times as long as that of the machines of the leading American firm, Xerox, in view of the fact that repairs on the Ricoh machine are much quicker, and this attests to their superior maintainability (one of the indicators of quality). One mechanic can service 100 of these machines and only 50 Xerox machines. It is no coincidence that Japan now controls 40 percent of the market for "reliable machines that are simple to use and require little effort for their operation and maintenance." The Xerox company, which was accustomed to its monopoly status, underestimated the Japanese competition, and its share of the market for inexpensive machines decreased to 31 percent by the beginning of the 1980's, while Japan gradually strengthened its position in this market and in sales of more complex and costly models (where Xerox still controls 60 percent of the market). On the average, the rate of defects in air conditioners is 70 times as high at American firms as at Japanese firms, and the American air conditioners are 17 times as likely to break down. According to some estimates, defective products account for 1.2 percent of all products in the Japanese processing industry, but the figure is 6 percent in the United States.

The superior quality of Japanese steel is attested to by the following fact. The American automobile corporations using 30 percent of the domestic steel output reject 10 percent of the sheet metal (because of surface defects and deviations from the norm in dimensions and chemical composition) and are purchasing more Japanese metal, because the quality of the sheet steel produced in Japan is 15 percent higher.¹²

The high uniformity and stability of Japanese products are quite important. For example, the computer chips produced by various firms in Japan are distinguished by the same high level of quality, whereas the quality of the products of American firms can differ by a factor of more than 1.5-2. In 1981 and 1982, D. Garvin, an assistant professor in the Harvard School of Business, surveyed 16 American and Japanese firms producing room air conditioners. As he writes, the difference in their quality was an "appalling discovery": Some of the commercial models of the best Japanese air conditioners were a thousand times better than the American models of the poorest quality.¹³ Commenting on the results of this survey, Professor K. Andrews of the Harvard School of Business remarked that it offered "shocking and irrefutable evidence of the mediocre performance of American production.... Our problem with regard to product quality would seem to be more serious than we thought."¹⁴

It is a fact that the quality of American products deteriorated throughout the 1970's, especially the quality of consumer goods. In January 1981 QUALITY

PROGRESS magazine published the results of a customer survey conducted by the American Society for Quality Control. The survey indicated that 50 percent of all the consumers believed that the quality of American goods had deteriorated in the last 5 years, and more than half (53 percent) expected the quality of American goods to stay the same or continue to deteriorate in the next 5 years.¹⁵ The deterioration of quality led to a decline in total sales. A 1980 survey in Wisconsin indicated that 48 percent of the respondents had trouble with their automobiles during the first year of operation--that is, during the warranty period. As a result, General Motors lost 12 percent of its customers, Ford lost 20 percent, Chrysler lost 36 percent, and American Motors lost 40 percent.¹⁶

Has the situation changed since that time? In 1985 the experts on quality control attending the annual quality congress in the United States were surveyed: 42 percent said that the quality of American durable consumer goods was comparable to the quality of Japanese products or better. In 1984 this response was chosen by 57 percent of those surveyed. When they were asked: "What symbolizes quality to you?"--more than half replied "Made in Japan," and only 37 percent replied "Made in USA."¹⁷ Quality control consultant L. Dorsky wrote: "Some people believe that the quality of American products is improving, but slowly. This is meaningless because success is determined in the marketplace."¹⁸

Our comparative evaluations should not create the impression that the difference in quality levels between American and Japanese products is a general rule. The United States is still the leader in the quality of many categories of products. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the products of American corporations are superior in quality to the products of their Japanese competitors in 72 of the 186 most important products (including computers, laser equipment, and pharmaceuticals), and the quality is approximately the same in another 60 cases. But the fact that the quality of 54 types of products manufactured in the United States is lower than that of Japanese goods is the cause of profound worries in the American business community.

It is precisely the loss of positions in the competitive struggle that explains the keen interest in Japanese methods of production management, aimed at a high level of product quality and labor productivity with a simultaneous lowering of overhead costs. Analyzing the causes of the successful development of the Japanese economy, American experts have singled out a few basic factors:

The purposeful efforts to achieve a high level of product quality on the national scale;

Large investments in new production equipment, advanced technology, and R & D;

The rapid mastery of advanced technology purchased abroad and the organization of the mass production of competitive products for the quickest possible reduction of overhead costs;

The constant and systematic search for ways of perfecting existing technology to improve product quality, lower overhead costs, and augment labor productivity;

A carefully planned system of product quality control.

An Improved Material and Technical Base as the Foundation of Superior Quality

When the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry resolved to restore the economy in the first years after the war, it began to compile national plans with clearly delineated priority fields of development in the most promising sectors. A country which imports 85 percent of its raw materials and power resources and around 30 percent of its food can only secure the reproduction of capital by exporting finished manufactured goods (95 percent of its total exports), and the high quality of these is the main factor stimulating trade. Therefore, the long-range strategy of economic recovery and of struggle for world markets was geared from the very beginning to competition in the field of quality. This national strategy presupposed several areas of implementation.

The modernization of industry was declared the primary objective. The fundamental principle was that high product quality could not be secured without modern production equipment. In connection with this, priority was assigned to the purchase of Western technology, the acquisition of licenses, and their rapid incorporation. Between 1950 and 1978 Japan signed 32,000 license agreements on the purchase of technology, primarily from the United States, and spent only 9 billion dollars on this--a negligible sum in comparison with the initial U.S. expenditures on the research and development of new technologies.¹⁹ Although Japan now sells its own technology to other countries, including developed capitalist countries, the United States is still the main exporter of technology to Japan, and this item accounts for its highest positive balance in trade with Japan.

Low taxes and available loan capital secured the high accumulation norm of Japanese corporations. From 1970 to 1979, 17.5 percent of the U.S. GNP was used for fixed capital, but the figure was 33 percent in Japan. Private capital investments in fixed producer goods and equipment in the United States accounted for 10 percent of the GNP on the average in the 1970's, but the figure in Japan was 16.8 percent. In 1978 Japanese per capita investments in the construction of new plants and in new equipment were twice as high as the U.S. figure.

This policy led to the establishment of a highly efficient material and technical base, constituting the foundation of guaranteed high product quality and high labor productivity.

By the beginning of the 1980's the average service life of fixed capital was 16-17 years in the United States and 10 years in Japan. The average age of machine tools is 7 years in Japan and 12 in the United States.²⁰ The automated control systems in the Japanese steel industry are the best in the world. Only 26 percent of the U.S. steel output is smelted by the continuous casting method, but in Japan the figure is 86 percent.²¹ It is precisely in ferrous metallurgy that Japan has a positive balance in the trade in technologies.

The investment policies of the majority of Japanese firms are now emphasizing the intensification of production. In 1970, for example, 60 percent of the

investments in the processing industry were used to enlarge production capacities to satisfy the increased demand for products. In 1980 the situation was quite different. Investments in the enlargement of capacities in response to the higher demand for series-produced items declined sharply, to 23.7 percent, but proportional investments in the remodeling of production increased dramatically and reached 50.5 percent of the total.

According to the estimates of J. Gregory, a professor at Sophia University in Tokyo, by 1982 Japanese industry had reached the advance frontiers of the "new industrial revolution" in production automation.²² According to American studies, at the time when considerable effort had already been made to modernize technology in the United States, the level of automation in Japan was almost twice as high in the steel industry, 1.5 times as high in shipbuilding, and 1.3 times as high in the automotive industry as in the United States. It is only in the chemical industry that the level of automation is approximately the same in both countries.²³

Considerable attention is being devoted in Japan, just as in the United States, to the establishment of flexible automated systems for the management of production complexes, which are regarded as an effective means of production intensification. Their approaches, however, differ. In the United States most of the effort and the lion's share of resources have been expended on the widespread incorporation of computerized design and automatic production management systems (the United States is far ahead of Japan in this field), the automation of quality control, and automated informational systems (up to 75 percent of the amount spent by firms on automation is used for this purpose), while robotization has accounted for only 2 percent and machine tools with programmed control have accounted for 10 percent.²⁴ This has allowed American firms to enhance the productivity of design engineering work considerably, develop new models of products rapidly, and be the recognized leaders in the incorporation of scientific and technical achievements, but it has caused them to lag far behind the Japanese in the improvement of the basic production processes.

Although all of the basic equipment for the automation of plants--machine tools with numerical programmed control, machining centers, flexible production systems, and robots--were developed first in the United States, Japan is now the leader in their production and use. In the second half of the 1970's the output of machining centers in Japan increased by an average of 69 percent a year, or twice as quickly as the output of machine tools with numerical programmed control. In 1982 the output of these centers represented 38.4 percent of the annual product of the machine tool industry. More than half of the machine tools in use were NPC tools (53.7 percent), whereas these accounted for only 5 percent of all the machine tools in the United States. The output of robots in Japan increased by an average of 38 percent a year from 1971 to 1981. At the beginning of the 1980's the annual output of robots in Japan was 10 times as great as the U.S. output. According to some estimates,²⁵ 67,300 industrial robots were being used in Japan in 1984 (48 percent in electrical engineering and 19 percent in the automotive industry), and 15,200 were being used in the United States.²⁶

The rapid mastery and spread of new technologies in Japan are often accomplished with the aid of nationwide programs. The history of the development of microelectronic technology is indicative in this context. In 1975 the Japanese Government drew up a plan for the mastery of superlarge computer chips. Five giant corporations financed the establishment of a research association, manned by scientists employed by these corporations, in 1976. The research findings were originally tested in two laboratories and were then incorporated in production on an experimental basis in each of these corporations. The united efforts and resources and the fierce competition in this field led to a situation in which four Japanese companies had already put the first chips on the market by the end of 1978. In 1981 Japan controlled 70 percent of the world market for the large chips, initially developed in the United States, with a RAM of 64 kilobytes, and these are highly reliable without backup circuits. Now Fujitsu, the leading Japanese corporation, is successfully mastering the production of the next generation of chips with a larger memory size (256 kilobytes and 1 megabyte).²⁷

The high rates of scientific and technical progress in Japan are largely the result of the high volume of capital investments in R & D and the increasing proportion of these investments in the GNP (from 1.4 percent in 1960 to 2.6 percent in 1984). By the end of the 1970's Japan was second only to the United States in terms of investments in R & D. The number of personnel engaged in scientific research in Japan exceeds the number of these specialists in England, France, and the FRG combined. It is particularly significant that the main difference in the use of scientific research personnel in Japan and the United States is that Japanese scientists, designers, and technologists do not concentrate on basic research and the invention of fundamentally new technologies and products (which are assigned indisputable priority in the United States), but on the rapid industrial incorporation of advanced technology, the organization of the mass production of new items, and the conservation of resources. More than 40 percent of the R & D expenditures of Japanese industrial firms are used in the development of labor-, energy-, and resource-saving technology.

Japan's very approach to the development of new equipment is unique. The majority of new developments are improvements rather than innovations. New equipment is frequently developed with the use of foreign patents and licenses, which costs less. The following example is indicative in this respect. In 1968 the American Unimation firm sold a license to Kawasaki Heavy Industries, a Japanese company, for the production of its technologically complex robot on terms favorable to the U.S. firm (a percentage of the sales of robots and the right to acquire technological improvements for free). After 14 years Kawasaki had still not added anything fundamentally new to the technology of robot production, but it had made many adjustments which expanded the sphere of robot use to such an extent that it became the largest supplier of robots with the Kawasaki Unimate trademark (9 percent of the robot market in Japan, where over 190 firms are manufacturing them), and is now exporting them even to the United States. A Unimation executive had this to say: "It is unlikely that the license fees were equivalent to even a tenth of what Kawasaki would have had to spend to develop the technology of robot production itself."²⁸

Up to 40 percent of the equipment installed in Japanese firms is improved, designed, or modified directly in the firm by its OWN engineers. It is no coincidence that the percentage of these among the production personnel of Japanese firms is at least twice as high as the indicator in U.S. companies. What is more, the Japanese prefer to locate their engineering and technical personnel and researchers directly in plants. The people who participate in the modification of equipment are not only design and technological engineers, however, but also the operators who have to service the equipment. Japanese workers and employees are quite active in making efficiency proposals. For example, although the largest automobile corporation in the United States, General Motors, offers a reward of 10,000 dollars for valuable suggestions, it receives an average of one suggestion per worker each year and incorporates only a third of them. At the Toyota plant near Nagoya, 10 suggestions per worker are submitted each year, and the firm incorporates most of them.

All of this testifies that scientific and technical policy in Japan, which is consciously geared to the creation of a highly productive industrial base as the foundation for guaranteed high product quality with a simultaneous savings in resources and the quicker incorporation of scientific and technical achievements, has proved effective in competition with the United States. Japan is now striving for scientific and technical advantages in some of the main high technology industries and the organization of its own research in several fields of basic and applied science. At the same time, the United States, which is still the leader in the most promising fields of scientific and technical progress, has made a considerable effort to modernize technology and remodel production facilities to enhance product quality and augment labor productivity. Preparations are being made for the next phase of the competitive struggle between the two main rivals in the capitalist world.

Some American researchers who have summed up the results of recent developments believe that the "equipment quality" factor still contributes more to the final result--the quality of finished products--in Japan than in the United States. The management factor contributes even more, and this will be discussed in the second part of the article.

(To be continued)

FOOTNOTES

1. The issue of the struggle for quality was brought up again in M.S. Gorbachev's speech at a CPSU Central Committee conference of 14 November 1986 on the institution of state acceptance committees at several Soviet enterprises. In connection with this, the editors intend to give foreign experience broader coverage. Here we wish to direct the reader's attention to the first part of an article by L.A. Konareva, researcher at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. She discusses three main topics connected with the quality of manufactured goods in the United States and Japan: quality and competition, the material and technical base of quality (part 1), and a comparative analysis of the two quality control systems (part 2)--Ed.

2. R.M. Tikhonov, "Konkurentosposobnost promyshlennoy produktsii" [The Competitive Potential of Manufactured Goods], Moscow, 1985, pp 18-20.
3. NATIONAL JOURNAL, 20 April 1985, pp 840-847; QUALITY PROGRESS, January 1986, p 12.
4. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 29 July 1985, pp 50-51.
5. FORTUNE, 10 June 1985, p 29.
6. "III Asia Pacific Congress on Quality Control Proceedings," Beijing, 1985, pp 423, 424.
7. For a more detailed discussion, see SSHA: EPI, 1986, No 4, pp 23-34; 1986, No 3, pp 26-38.
8. "How the USA and Europe Can Increase Productivity and Enhance Quality Control (An In-Depth Japanese Industrial Survey)," Tokyo, 1980, p 157.
9. FORTUNE, 28 October 1985, p 27; BUSINESS WEEK, 14 September 1981, pp 67, 100.
10. THE NEW REPUBLIC, 7 February 1981, p 23.
11. INDUSTRIAL QUALITY CONTROL, January 1967, p 336.
12. QUALITY PROGRESS, October 1985, pp 57-59.
13. HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, September-October 1983, p 65.
14. FINANCIAL TIMES, 17 October 1983, p 16.
15. QUALITY PROGRESS, January 1981, pp 12-14.
16. ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, September 1980, pp 407-427.
17. QUALITY PROGRESS, October 1985, p 79.
18. "ASQC 37th Annual Quality Congress Transactions," Boston, 24-26 May 1983, p 290.
19. CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW, Winter 1984, p 18.
20. COMPUTERS AND PEOPLE, March-April 1981, p 26.
21. BUSINESS WEEK, 13 June 1983, p 48.
22. MANAGEMENT TODAY, April 1984, pp 66-71.
23. Calculated according to data in QUALITY, March 1985, p 45.

24. INDUSTRY WEEK, 28 May 1984, p 51.
25. It must be said that published data on the number of robots used in the United States and Japan differ widely. Some experts believe that two-thirds of the 90,000 robots used in Japanese industrial firms are manipulators performing simple production operations, such as moving parts from one place to another, and do not correspond to the American definition of the robot. With a view to these distinctions, there were 30,000 robots in Japan and 6,000 in the United States at the beginning of the 1980's (FORBES, 14 March 1983, p 154).
26. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 19 December 1985, pp 51-52.
27. THE ECONOMIST, 19 June 1982, pp 10, 13 Survey.
28. FORBES, 14 March 1983, p 154.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1987

8588
CSO: 1803/08

U.S. LATIN AMERICA POLICY EXAMINED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87
(signed to press 13 Mar 87) pp 53-59

[Article by P.G. Litavrin: "The United States and Political Shifts in Latin America"]

[Text] The political events of recent years in Latin America led to the replacement of military regimes and dictatorships in several countries with bourgeois democratic and provisional governments. The establishment of civilian governments in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay in 1983 and 1984, the fall of one of the most brutal and oldest dictatorships, the Duvalier regime in Haiti, in February 1986, the unprecedented growth of the antifascist movement in Chile, and the intensification of struggle against the Stroessner dictatorship in Paraguay proved once again that democratization is becoming an important trend in the political development of the region. It consists not only in the formal transfer of authority to civilians, but also in the advancement of the broad popular masses, democratic coalitions, and leftist forces actively fighting for profound social changes in society, to the front of the political stage in most of the countries of this continent.

There have been more than enough statements in support of democracy in Latin America by top-level U.S. Government officials. President Reagan spoke of this to the members of Congress on 3 February 1984 and in Grenada on 20 February 1986, and he was echoed by Vice-President G. Bush and Secretary of State G. Shultz. When Grenada's sovereignty was trampled by the U.S. Marines, President Reagan said: "The tide of freedom is rising in our hemisphere.... We will not rest until the people of all the Americas can join us under the benevolent light of freedom and justice."

In reality, however, it was the United States that planted the Somoza and Duvalier dictatorships and helped Pinochet overthrow S. Allende's democratic government. Justifying the policy of supporting dictatorships, well-known American political scientist S. Huntington remarked in a COMMENTARY article in 1981 that although the United States is for democracy in principle, right-wing dictatorships are preferable to leftwing ones in Latin America because the former are supposedly "less repressive," and they are "more inclined to restore democracy and more open to Western influence." The inescapable conclusion is that rightwing regimes will sooner or later supposedly give up

their place to bourgeois democracy and that a struggle must be waged against the leftist regimes supported by world communism.

This approach is quite typical of the neoconservative interpretation of the political situation in Latin America, in accordance with which the conflicts and cataclysms and the growth of the revolutionary liberation movement in several countries are viewed by the Republican administration primarily as a result of outside intervention, of the intrigues of Cuba and the USSR, and not as a result of an internal socioeconomic crisis. Given this approach, it is quite understandable that problems of political development and the organization of reforms and elections in the Central American countries are of secondary importance in the system of U.S. political priorities. The President himself cogently expressed this in 1982 when he said: "When the rebels have been crushed, it will be time to think about elections." In other words, the defense of human rights and democracy can be sacrificed for the sake of pro-American stability. This applies above all to Central America, where, in the opinion of the American leadership, there was no time for experiments with political systems when immediate action had to be taken to save the dependent regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

In its first years in office, the Reagan Administration took several steps to "correct" relations with military regimes and dictatorships. Military and economic aid to Honduras was resumed and increased, relations between the United States and Chile improved perceptibly, American-Chilean maneuvers began to be conducted again, and the Pinochet regime received generous subsidies from the IMF and the IBRD. The issues of human rights and the restoration of democracy were virtually removed from the agenda of Washington's talks with several Latin American countries. The Republican administration not only refused to exert pressure on military regimes, but even supported and encouraged them. In reference to this, President J. Sanguinetti of Uruguay said that the Reagan Administration had never had much interest in defending human rights and supporting democracy in Latin America and that it had only recently begun "making statements and gestures in support of democratization."

Of course, this change in the U.S. position was no coincidence. First of all, the slogans regarding the defense of human rights and the support of democracy were too appealing and important to ignore, especially after the Republican administration made the idea of defending "Western democratic values" the cornerstone of its foreign policy rhetoric. This, however, is inconsistent with the United States' own policy in Central America and appears unconvincing to Latin Americans and to many people in the United States. Congress also influenced the administration's position on this matter. As H. Wiarda, an expert on Latin American affairs, remarked in an article in CURRENT HISTORY in February 1985, the Reagan Administration "suddenly began vigorously supporting democracy in this region not only because it believes in it, but also because it knows that the goal of supporting democracy is approved by Congress, the masses, and public opinion."

In the second place, politics in Latin America in the first half of the 1980's objectively weakened the position of military groups and oligarchies and led to the growth of broad democratic movements, the reinforcement of the party

system, and the gradual erosion of the dictatorial regimes, which could no longer depend on brute strength alone to keep them in power. The completion of the state-monopoly modernization in Brazil and Argentina made large segments of the local bourgeoisie, not to mention the broad popular masses, more resentful of the power of the dictatorships and gave them the desire to participate in politics and in public administration. In turn, the severe crisis of the dependent regimes in Central America issued a clear warning to the United States: These regimes are not only incapable of the political settlement of internal conflicts but are also having trouble staying in power. Under these conditions, any attempt to rely on them directly would be risky from the standpoint of politics and propaganda.

The events in El Salvador also had a significant impact. Washington's unsuccessful attempts to "teach a lesson to Cuba and Nicaragua" and the increasingly obvious local roots of the crisis compelled even official spokesmen for the administration, such as then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs T. Enders, to admit that "Cuban intervention, of course, is not the only cause of instability."

All of this forced the Reagan Administration to revise its oversimplified approach to the political development of Latin America. Two basic points of view took shape during the widespread debates in the United States in the first half of the 1980's.

The neoconservative point of view--supported by political scientists A. Perlmutter and R. MacDonald, former U.S. representative to the United Nations J. Kirkpatrick, and former Secretary of State A. Haig--consists in the belief that although the United States should support the process of democratization in the region, it must do this carefully, gradually, and selectively. This group is afraid that democratization will turn into an uncontrollable political process which could set the masses in motion and stimulate an increase in revolutionary feelings, which would not be in the interest of the United States. It is no wonder that "Stability in the Western Hemisphere. Latin America," an anthology of articles by the Pittsburgh Council on Foreign Relations published in 1983, said that virtually all of the Latin American countries "lack the political experience and historical traditions lying at the basis of Western democracies." In the opinion of the authors, this is why the destabilization of governments, the seizure of power, and coups are so common in Latin America.

The supporters of this approach have traditionally viewed events in Central America through the prism of "the struggle between totalitarianism and democracy" and therefore recommend the support of military regimes "capable of evolving," as they maintain, in the direction of democracy, because "communist regimes" might otherwise win the battle. "The United States must develop a balanced approach to Central America, the kind taking local conditions into account and simultaneously considering the regional and global aspects," A. Haig wrote. J. Kirkpatrick expressed her opinion more prudently: "We need the kind of policy in defense of human rights that is realistic and focuses on reasonable goals."

The main theses of this approach to problems in political development in the region were set forth in the report of the Kissinger Commission¹ and in special congressional hearings. In essence, they stipulate that the United States should support limited reforms and the gradual expansion of civil liberties but should be tolerant of their restriction if this should be needed for the maintenance of stability. Above all, this applies to Central America, where there are no strong traditions of democratic rule (except in Costa Rica), where the middle class is weak, and where class and political conflicts are acute.

The collapse of the military dictatorships in South America and the establishment of civilian governments in its largest countries, Brazil and Argentina, forced the neoconservatives to make more frequent statements in support of democracy in the region. To some extent, this was made possible by the greater political stability here than in Central America.

In contrast to the neoconservatives, another large group of American experts and politicians adhere to moderate and liberal views. The range of opinions and judgments here is quite broad and diffuse. The main difference between this group and the neoconservatives, however, is that it acknowledges the need for the unequivocal support of democratic processes in the region.

Renowned expert A. Lowenthal, for example, advocates the principled support of democratic systems in Latin America regardless of political circumstances and restrictions, because bourgeois democracy, in his opinion, is the only way of securing lasting stability and the development of capitalism, and repression in Latin America will eventually have negative political implications for the United States. The abovementioned H. Wiarda criticizes the Reagan Administration's habitual manipulation of the term "fight for democracy."

One of the representatives of the liberal left wing of American experts, P. Gleijeses, criticized the administration's attempt to portray the election farce in El Salvador as evidence of democracy in this country. He wrote that "the U.S. attempts to promote democracy through intervention have always failed."

These views of representatives of the critical current of researchers of political developments in the region agreed in many respects with the position of political parties in Western Europe and the Socintern, which have traditionally maintained close contacts with political parties and social movements in Latin America. In particular, the American leadership's approach to the process of democratization in Latin America was criticized in the decisions of the 17th Socintern Congress in Lima in June 1986. The governments of France, Spain, and Italy expressed support for democracy in Latin America and for the free development of political forces, including the advancement of leftist forces to the front of the political stage.

A special study by the Council on Foreign Relations, "Instability in the Third World: Central America--A Problem in U.S. Relations with Western Europe" (1985), said "instead of trying to impose political conformity by military means, it would be better...to promote the political and diplomatic

settlement of conflicts in Central America in such a way as to strengthen the position of political forces and parties acceptable from the standpoint of U.S. interests, and to contribute as much as possible to the triumph of values coinciding with American values."

Many bourgeois politicians in Latin America have expressed similar liberal-reformist views. They are trying to convince Washington to give up its interventionist policy line, to relax its financial and protectionist pressure, and to aid in the resolution of the economic problems of the region. The speech presented by President R. Alfonsin of Argentina at a conference on "The Reinforcement of Democracy on the American Continent" held in the United States in November 1986 is indicative in this respect. In particular, he said: "It is not easy to preserve the values of democracy when whole population groups have no chance of enjoying these values in their daily life, when poverty deprives the individual of his dignity, when the absence of choices makes freedom meaningless, and when ignorance hampers respect for dissenting views."

Therefore, by the middle of the 1980's even the allies of the United States disagreed in many respects with Washington's policy in Latin America. The failure of the interventionist line in Central America, the objective development of the political situation on the continent, and the critical position of world public opinion all helped to change the Reagan Administration's approach to political processes in the region.

Above all, Washington is striving to take control of the process of democratization and use it to keep the countries of the region dependent on the United States. The collapse of the dictatorships and military regimes imposed on these countries by imperialism has recently shifted the focus to the improvement of the system of bourgeois domination of the continent, for the purpose of the more effective resistance of revolutionary processes and the guarantee of the heightened stability of capitalism in conjunction with ruling circles in the Latin American countries.

With a view to the weaker position of military groups, oligarchies, and personal dictatorships and the stronger position of the grand and middle bourgeoisie, closely connected with the TNC's, and, in addition, with a view to the growth of nationalist and democratic movements on the continent, the United States is trying to intercept the process of democratization and direct it into a channel more favorable to imperialism. With its repeated statements in support of democracy and the offer of economic assistance to countries where civilian governments have already been established or where this transfer is now being made, the United States is striving to control the political changes and keep them out of the truly democratic, anti-imperialist channel.

In some cases, as in Brazil, for example, the Reagan Administration has been able to rely more on the ability of local political groups to develop bourgeois democratic institutions because of the considerable dependence of the country on international, primarily American, banks and TNC's, the relatively weak revolutionary movement, and the interest of most of the local bourgeoisie in the maintenance of pro-imperialist stability.

In some countries, however, the establishment of independent democratic administrations has meant the retention and even the intensification of political conflicts between them and Washington, because the new governments (for example, those of R. Alfonsin in Argentina, J. Sanguinetti in Uruguay, and A. Garcia in Peru) want to pursue an independent line in domestic and international affairs. With a view to the internal balance of power, they have imposed some restrictions on transnational corporations and have taken independent actions in foreign policy: Uruguay's closer contacts with Nicaragua, Peru's limited payments on its foreign debt, and Bolivia's restored relations with Cuba. All of this proves that democratization in the region is not always in Washington's interest. Sometimes, as in Chile, for example, the United States finds itself in a difficult but familiar position. The odious features of the Pinochet regime and its inability to govern the country are forcing Washington to dissociate itself from this dictatorship and to express its dissatisfaction. When the Chilean minister of finance visited the United States last spring, the IBRD was prompted by the United States to make the extension of loans conditional upon the lifting of the state of siege in the country. In fact, however, the United States has confined itself to purely verbal condemnations of the junta and to symbolic measures, because, as the BALTIMORE SUN remarked, "authoritarian regimes should not be pushed to the point of instability for the sake of American democracy."

Although American ruling circles express support for the process of democratization, especially now that it has become the main tendency in continental politics, they are also taking steps which are completely inconsistent with the appeals for the "support of democracy" in Latin America. These include the restrictions on imports from Latin American countries, the refusal to review the huge debt of the countries of this region, which reached 380 billion dollars in 1986, the interference of the IMF and other financial organizations in the internal affairs of Latin American states, and the imposition of new shackling loan terms. In general, as H. Wiarda wrote in the abovementioned CURRENT HISTORY article, Reagan's economic policy at a time of economic crisis in the developing countries "could undermine regional political models, and especially the position of democratic governments." And although military groups in several countries are now wary of political involvement, preferring to leave the burden of economic difficulties on the shoulders of civilian governments, it is possible that they would become politically active in the event of an internal crisis (this was confirmed by the recent kidnapping of the president of Ecuador by military officials). The U.S. economic and financial pressure on such countries as Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina could seriously influence the development of the fragile democratic process and weaken civilian governments.

The main reason for the duality of American policy is that the Republican administration is in a difficult position and has had to resort to maneuvers. After all, stronger economic pressure on democratic governments in the region could radicalize the laboring masses and heighten internal instability and could even cause ruling circles to shift to the left and to take a more resolute anti-imperialist stand.

In pursuit of their goals in the region, U.S. ruling circles are assuming the functions of a court of arbitration, deciding the status of human rights in

various Latin American countries and the degree of democracy in various governments. For example, in May 1986 the U.S. Congress seriously discussed the problem of the insufficiently democratic political system in Mexico, setting off an explosion of rage in Mexico, and called the election farce in Guatemala a "model of democracy." The underlying motives are more than obvious: Washington had to exert pressure on Mexico because many of its neighbor's domestic political undertakings and foreign policy initiatives are contrary to U.S. interests, and it had to support dependent regimes in Central America.

In general, the Reagan Administration's approach to the process of democratization in the region is of a clearly imperialist, class nature, although it has been used for all sorts of maneuvers. The process of democratization is developing in different ways in different countries. In some cases, Washington has to confine itself to meaningless rhetoric about the support of democracy in the hemisphere, but in others it has to consider U.S. interests in each specific political situation.

It is no secret that the conservative U.S. leadership has been worried from the very beginning of this process that the struggle for the establishment of bourgeois democracy could strengthen forces advocating broader social reforms. Prominent expert C. Doran described the attitude of American ruling circles toward democratic processes in Latin America quite eloquently almost 10 years ago: "Before it can actively oppose a rightwing regime, the United States has to have at least some guarantees as to the nature of the government which will replace it." Wary of the uncontrolled development of democratization, the Reagan Administration has maintained close contacts with the armed forces of Latin American countries. In spite of the protests of the democratic public, joint American-Bolivian maneuvers were conducted in April 1986. As U.S. embassy spokesman J. Biggs said, one of the duties of Latin American armed forces is to "defend and strengthen democracy on the continent." Latin Americans appreciated the bitter irony of this statement: There have been more military coups in Bolivia (150) than in any other country on the continent.

There have been new efforts to involve the Latin American countries in Washington's plans to militarize the southern Atlantic. The chief of the U.S. Southern Command, J. Galvin, went to Paraguay to discuss the matter with dictator Stroessner and then went to Argentina to explore the possibilities for the resumption of American-Argentine military cooperation.

For several reasons (the huge foreign debt of the countries of the region, their economic, scientific, and technical dependence on the United States, and others), the Reagan Administration is still able to influence the process of democratization and prevent the consolidation of the position of progressive forces. It is also apparent, however, that the consolidation of independent democratic governments will objectively intensify political conflicts between them and Washington. Even in Brazil, as JORNAL DO BRASIL remarked, the government has had to take the anti-American feelings in the society, which became particularly widespread after the end of the military government, into account. In one way or another, the important political changes in Latin

America will contribute to the intensification of the already serious conflicts between the United States and its southern neighbors.

FOOTNOTES

1. Created by President Reagan in August 1983 and consisting of 12 officials from both parties who made recommendations regarding "long-range U.S. policy in the region"--Ed.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1987

8588

CSO: 1803/08

PROBLEMS FACING 100TH CONGRESS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87
(signed to press 13 Mar 87) pp 69-77

[Article by Yu.A. Ivanov]

[Text] The first session of the 100th U.S. Congress began on 6 January. Significant changes have taken place in the Capitol.

Since the start of the Reagan Administration there has been a distinctive and rare balance of power in Congress: The House of Representatives has been controlled by the Democratic Party, and the majority in the Senate has belonged to the President's party--to the Republicans. As a result of the elections last November, the Democrats now hold the majority in both houses of the new Congress: 55 seats in the Senate (the Republicans have 45), and 258 of the 435 seats in the House of Representatives.

There is no question that the transfer of control of both houses to the opposition party has considerably undermined the administration's influence in the Capitol, but the political scandal in Washington over the illegal arms sales to Iran and the financing of the Nicaraguan "Contras" has been equally devastating, if not more so. It is still weakening the White House's position and has already led to a sharp decline in President Reagan's personal popularity. The facts of American political history testify that the role of Congress always becomes more important under these conditions, including its role in foreign policy matters.

The new Congress intends to conduct the most thorough investigation of the "Irangate" scandal. The new speaker of the House, Jim Wright (Democrat, Texas), who is beginning his 17th term in Congress, criticized the White House with unprecedented vehemence in connection with this scandal. "It is completely obvious and indisputable that the law has been broken, or even several laws," Wright declared. He said that the very "idea that the President can ignore or break the law at will" is absolutely deplorable.¹

During the first days of the new session both houses created special commissions to investigate this political scandal. The Senate's commission is headed by D. Inouye (Democrat, Hawaii), and the House commission is headed by L. Hamilton (Democrat, Indiana). The Republicans in the Congress tried to

limit the injuries the investigation would inflict on the administration by insisting on its completion as quickly as possible. The Democrats conceded and agreed that the Senate commission's final report should be published no later than 1 August, but stipulated that the deadline could be extended to 30 October by a decision of the Senate. Therefore, the "Irangate" hearings will continue throughout the next few months and possibly until fall, and they certainly do not hold out the promise of laurels for the Reagan Administration.

With this step and its other first moves, the new Congress showed that it would not be tractable in its dealings with the White House. On the very first day of the session the clean water bill which had been approved by the last Congress but had then been vetoed by President Reagan in November 1986 was resubmitted for discussion without any changes whatsoever. Within a day the bill had been approved by a vote of 406 to 8 in the House, and a few days later it also won Senate approval. The President's stubborn refusal to accept a bill supported by both party factions aroused anger in the Capitol. Expressing the Democrats' view on the radio, Congressman J. Howard (New Jersey) said that the President was requesting billions for his Star Wars program but refused to support the allocation of 18 billion dollars for a 3-year program to combat water pollution.

The President vetoed the bill again, but within the first month of the session the legislators overrode his veto, and the program acquired legal force. This episode presaged many conflicts between the White House and the Capitol in the next 2 years, in which the executive branch could suffer defeats.

The start of the new Congress' work proved that many of its members are deeply disturbed by the administration's obsession with military superiority to the USSR and its refusal to respond constructively to the Soviet peace initiatives. Four important legislative proposals were introduced with the aim of promoting the conclusion of Soviet-American disarmament agreements.

In the House, Democrats R. Gephardt (Missouri) and P. Schroeder (Colorado) introduced a bill on a mutual moratorium on tests of nuclear warheads. It envisages the congressional impoundment of funds for nuclear tests for a 12-month period if the President does not announce the termination of these tests. This bill is largely a repetition of the House amendment which was approved last August and will be discussed later. According to some estimates, from 200 to 250 legislators in the House are inclined to support this bill, and a vote on the proposal in some form could take place this spring.

A draft resolution on the preservation and implementation of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems was submitted to the House for discussion by Democrats L. AuCoin (Oregon) and N. Dicks (Washington). The resolution states that the secretary of defense will not be empowered to test or deploy ABM systems or components prohibited by the treaty unless the President submits evidence to Congress that the Soviet Union is conducting such tests and deployment.

A large group of members of the House of Representatives also introduced a bill on the limitation and reduction of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons in

accordance with the existing arms limitation agreements. It envisages the refusal to finance the deployment and maintenance of nuclear arms exceeding the limits set in the SALT II treaty. A draft resolution extending the ban on tests of American antisatellite weapons against targets in space to fiscal year 1988 was also introduced, and it will become part of the corresponding legislation if it is approved.

In accordance with the requirements of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,² President Reagan submitted his draft budget for fiscal year 1988 to the Congress on 5 January. In the opinion of most American political observers, the President's seventh draft differs little from earlier ones: It again recommends the buildup of military muscle, cuts in social programs, and the refusal to raise taxes. For the first time since the start of this administration, the actual amount allocated by Congress is used as the basis for the calculation of military expenditures instead of the administration's own overstated demands. In comparison to this amount, the new military budget will be increased by more than 20 billion dollars, and will amount to 312 billion. At the same time, sharp cuts are envisaged in programs of student aid, low-income housing, the development of public transport, food assistance for the needy, etc. The program of aid to farmers is slated for the largest cut--5 billion dollars.

The draft budget would keep the deficit within the limits set in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, at 108 billion dollars. Members of Congress immediately noted that this was an unrealistic prospect: Federal revenues are obviously overstated and expenditures are understated in the President's budget message. Besides this, more than half of the projected reduction of the deficit is to be covered by sales of government securities and stock.

In the last 2 years the President's draft budgets, based on the same principle, were rejected by Congress, which drew up its own, more realistic budgets. The new draft repeats this requirement, which is obviously unacceptable to the legislators, and this indicates that the President is preparing for a confrontation with the Democratic-controlled Congress. "This is a purely political document having nothing to do with the actual functioning of government," Democratic Senator G. Mitchell (Maine) said when he was interviewed by the CBS television network. The fact that the President's proposed budget has little chance of being approved without substantial changes was also confirmed by Senate Majority Leader R. Byrd (West Virginia) and Republican leader R. Dole (Kansas).

There is no question that the President's suggested solutions to the difficult problems the nation is facing after 6 years of his administration are completely unacceptable to Congress. But the fact is that Congress--Republicans and Democrats--are not prepared either to propose radical solutions to such difficult problems as the huge federal budget deficit, the trade deficit, and several others.

At the end of 1986 the highly experienced American political correspondent J. Reston wrote: "The time has come to pay the bill, and there is a general feeling of anxiety in the country and a sense that something is wrong.... Not

long ago we were disturbed by the Democratic Party's inclination to 'spend and spend.' Now the Democrats are complaining that the Republicans 'borrow and borrow and spend and spend.'"³

Even in the last Congress, the 99th (1985-1986), there was a growing realization--and not only among Democrats--that "something was wrong," that it was wrong to keep following the lead of the Reagan Administration obediently while it wasted hundreds of billions of dollars on every imaginable type of weapon while making larger and larger cuts in social programs and increasing budget deficits and the national debt each year. In essence, all of the difficult problems this Congress has been dealing with from its first days are rooted in the heated debates and battles in the last Congress. But the balance in Congress and between the Capitol and the White House was different then.

The desire to reduce the federal budget deficit was the focal point of congressional activity last year, and the attempts to limit the unrestrained growth of military expenditures provide direct evidence of this. In addition, it was the prevailing opinion that the social programs which appeared necessary to everyone but rightwing ideologists and the President had to be saved from encroachments by the administration. In 1986 the American public's profound worries about the threat of nuclear disaster and about the administration's unconstructive position at the Soviet-American disarmament talks were also reflected in the activities of the House of Representatives, and to some extent in Senate activities as well.

Congress' attempts to adjust domestic and foreign policies to make them more reasonable and consistent led to confrontations with the White House. Congress, which is more sensitive to the mood of the voters, expressed the prevailing views in the nation, while the administration took an essentially unyielding position and gradually lost the support of Americans. Nevertheless, Reagan's personal popularity and the fact that the Senate was controlled by the President's own party allowed the White House to win some of the battles with the Capitol in 1986 even when there was no public support for the administration's position. For example, the Congress had to agree to the President's request for 100 million dollars for overt aid to the Nicaraguan contras, although all public opinion polls invariably proved that over 60 percent of the Americans were against this move. In general, only 56 percent of the President's legislative initiatives were approved by the Congress in 1986, but the figure was 82 percent during Reagan's first year in office.

The Capitol and the White House fought over the size and content of the federal budget for FY 1987 for almost the entire last congressional session. The draft budget the administration submitted to Congress on 5 February 1986 reflected Reagan's traditional three-in-one formula--the incessant growth of military expenditures, cuts in social programs, and a refusal to raise taxes. The administration requested 320.3 billion dollars for military needs. In other words, it wanted an increase of more than 8 percent. At the same time, the federal administration proposed the complete elimination of more than 40 domestic programs and envisaged substantial cuts in many others, which should, according to administration estimates, save 23 billion dollars. The

administration planned to keep the budget deficit within the limits set by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, but this assumption rested on obviously overstated estimates of future revenues.

The response to the administration's draft budget in the Capitol was quite skeptical. Senator W. Bradley (Democrat, New Jersey) believed that the budget would not be supported by even a fourth of the Republican-controlled Senate. Within a month after the draft was submitted, the Senate Budget Committee rejected it: The votes against it were cast not only by 10 Democrats but also by 6 Republicans. Furthermore, even some of the six Republicans who supported the President's budget frankly admitted that they were against it but were voting for it out of loyalty to the White House. In the last days of April 1986 the Senate voted on the President's proposal on the cancellation of social programs, and it was also rejected, by a vote of 83 to 14.

As a result, just as in 1985, the administration's budget was rejected by both houses. They then began drafting their own budgets. Each house prepared its own draft, a conference committee then went to work, and on 27 June both houses approved a resolution reflecting a budget concept differing considerably from the President's. The resolution limited military expenditures to 292.1 billion dollars--that is, approximately 28 billion less than the administration had requested. Congress did not agree with the President's request to abolish dozens of domestic programs: Expenditures on them were either frozen or cut slightly, but they were not subjected to the slashes the White House had demanded. The budget deficit in the resolution also did not exceed the limits of the law, although many members of Congress did not conceal their doubts about the possibility of actually attaining this goal.

The budget resolution, however, sets only the total expenditures in various fields in the coming fiscal year. These general guidelines are then made more specific in the authorizing legislation prepared by the standing committees of the houses and take their final form in bills on appropriations. For this reason, after the budget resolution had been approved, attention was focused on the work of committees. After the White House had suffered a defeat during the discussion of the overall structure of the budget, the administration virtually ceased to try to influence the fate of domestic programs. It apparently realized that it could not get any more from Congress. Besides this, administration strategists were afraid that confrontations could undermine the approval of the President's pet project--his tax reform.

The administration did, however, continue its vigorous fight against military budget cuts. In July the House Committee on the Armed Services reduced the Pentagon budget again--to 285 billion dollars. After this Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger publicly accused the committee of political cowardice and even said that its actions would hamper the efforts to "keep the peace throughout the world." The President invited a group of congressmen to breakfast in the White House and urged them to rescind the cuts in military spending--otherwise, they would undermine the "prospects for the conclusion of arms control agreements." The Reagan Administration fought against these cuts until October, until the final decisions were made on military appropriations.

Meanwhile, the process of drafting budget legislation took its normal course in Congress. In August a bill on military programs for FY 1987 for a total of 287 billion dollars was approved by a significant majority in the House; the Senate's bill set these expenditures at 295 billion dollars.

The drafting of bills on appropriations was an extraordinarily lengthy process. Not one of the 13 bills was ready by the end of September. It was not until the end of the session that all of them were combined in an omnibus bill on appropriations consisting of 1,200 pages and weighing more than 8 kilograms. This tactical maneuver was motivated less by the desire to save time on the passage of the bills than by the hope of forcing the President to accept the budget as a whole: He could veto the entire bill, but not parts of it.

The session lasted 2 weeks longer than expected, and it was not until 17 October that the omnibus bill was approved and was then signed by the President the next day. Military appropriations for FY 1987 were set at 291.8 billion dollars--considerably below the administration's request and even slightly below the figure for the previous fiscal year. Actual U.S. military expenditures will continue to rise for several years, however, because of the huge sums allocated during Reagan's first years in the White House. Congressional leaders also congratulated themselves on their success in reducing federal expenditures by 2 percent while retaining all domestic programs but one, even if these had to be limited or cut. The federal budget deficit, at least on paper, should not exceed the limit of 144 billion dollars set in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. This, however, was not the result of the real reduction of expenditures, but of creative bookkeeping and the projected sale of government property and securities.

The main reason that the session went on so long and the bill on appropriations was approved so late, 2 weeks after the beginning of the new fiscal year, was not the budget itself, but the confrontation between the Capitol and the White House over budget amendments. They concerned the issue of disarmament and were introduced in the House of Representatives.

Back in February 1986 a resolution requesting the President to take steps toward the ratification of the Soviet-American agreements on the limitation of nuclear tests of the 1970's and to ask the Soviet Union to begin negotiating a total test ban was approved by the overwhelming majority of congressmen in the House of Representatives. Later this resolution was also approved in the Senate. The administration, however, preferred to ignore Congress' request, just as it ignored the Soviet Union's request to join it in its unilateral moratorium on tests.

When the House of Representatives began discussing the bill on Pentagon expenditures in August, a draft amendment was introduced, stipulating that the funds allocated by Congress in the calendar year of 1987 could not be spent on nuclear tests as long as the Soviet Union continued to refrain from these tests. The draft was introduced by a large group of Democratic congressmen, including members of the party faction leadership--then Majority Leader J. Wright, Majority Whip T. Foley (Washington), L. Aspin (Wisconsin), R. Gephardt, P. Schroeder, J. Spratt (South Carolina), and others.

The amendment was discussed in the House on 8 August. The discussion was quite heated. The opponents of the amendment mainly repeated the administration's old and unconvincing arguments against a moratorium on nuclear tests. Its supporters argued that it could be an important first step toward the cessation of the arms race. Now that the Soviet Union had expressed its willingness to use comprehensive methods of technical verification, they said, the verification of the observance of a mutual moratorium would not be a problem. House member C. Collins (Democrat, Illinois) said: "The Soviet Union has not set off a single nuclear device since last August and it has asked the United States to join it in the moratorium on tests. This is a golden opportunity for the achievement of nuclear stability. Those of us who support arms control have been asking the Soviets for years to take steps to demonstrate their sincerity. Now that they have done this, the United States must take the same steps."⁴

The amendment was approved by a clear majority--234 to 155--at the end of the day. In the next few days the House approved several other amendments to the bill on defense programs with the aim of promoting Soviet-American dialogue on disarmament issues; these were N. Dicks' amendment prohibiting the financing of work on the development of nuclear weapons systems in excess of the limits set in the SALT II treaty and amendments extending the ban on tests of anti-satellite systems against targets in space for another year and postponing the production of chemical binary weapons for a year. The House also limited the expenditures on Reagan's Star Wars program to 3.1 billion dollars.

The White House's response was immediate and categorical: A statement published on 15 August said that the House bill could "weaken our national security and undermine the difficult and delicate arms control talks" and that the President would therefore veto it. The opponents of disarmament inside and outside the Congress, particularly former Senator and member of the American delegation at the Geneva talks J. Tower, loudly accused the House of exceeding its authority and illegally interfering in the foreign policy sphere, where the President makes the final decisions.

In an article in THE WASHINGTON POST, McGeorge Bundy, former national security adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, a man known to support strong presidential authority, answered these critics: "There is no question that Congress has the constitutional right to refuse to allocate the funds needed for tests, for antisatellite weapons, or for MIRV'ed missiles when it feels that these expenditures are a waste of the taxpayer's money. Congress is not exceeding its powers when it links its decisions with the actions of other governments having a bearing on the matter.... Congress has the constitution and historical precedents on its side."⁵ It is true that when the House enveloped all of its amendments on disarmament issues in decisions on financial matters, it resorted to the use of its "power of the purse"--the indisputable right of Congress to make the final decisions on the financing of any federal government action--in the sphere of foreign policy (which happens quite rarely).

The House's passage of amendments expressing disagreement with the administration's obstructionist policy on disarmament attested to significant shifts in American public opinion under the influence of the Soviet Union's major

initiatives in this sphere. Congress has to take note of the changes that are taking place in American public opinion in spite of the administration's anti-Soviet and chauvinistic campaign. When Congressman R. Gephardt spoke in support of the amendment on the cessation of nuclear tests in the House, he said: "We have a responsibility to express the keen desire of our citizens for a more reasonable nuclear future."⁶

The House later included all of these amendments in the bill on defense appropriations, but the Senate's bill did not contain these restrictions. At the beginning of October the two bills were examined by a conference committee, which prepared the final draft of the omnibus bill on appropriations. The Reagan Administration categorically refused to consent to the House amendments, and this became one of the main reasons for the long delays in the passage of legislation on appropriations.

Literally on the next day after the coming meeting in Reykjavik was announced, the administration tried to use the news to exert pressure on the House of Representatives. The President and other officials spread the dubious rumor that the House amendments would "bind the hands" of the President and put him in a difficult position at the coming talks. The White House and the Republican senators on the conference committee refused to engage in any further talks with House representatives on the bill on defense appropriations. For several days the Democratic leaders in the House resisted the administration's flagrant pressure and refused to concede, proposing the postponement of the discussion of the amendments until after the summit meeting or even until the beginning of the next year as a compromise. In response to all of the accusations hurled at the House, Speaker T. O'Neill said: "I do not think that this will bind his (the President's--Yu.I.) hands that much." "We are not undermining your position, Mr. President, we are giving you encouragement," said Congressman Edward Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts).

Nevertheless, the administration refused to accept any proposals whatsoever regarding the postponement of the discussion of the amendments.

In the fear that the talk about undermining the President's position at the meeting with the Soviet leader would have a negative effect on the outcome of the elections coming up in a few weeks, on 10 October, just before the President's departure for Reykjavik, the Democrats gave up most of their demands. This reaffirmed a traditional rule of the American political game: Congress has to support the President when he faces an opponent in the international arena. Explaining the reasons for the Democrats' political move, E. Markey said that the President no longer had "any excuse to come back home empty-handed."⁷

By the terms of the compromise reached on 10 October, the ban on tests of antisatellite weapons was the only one of the House amendments to be included in the bill on appropriations with no changes. The level of SDI financing was set at 3.5 billion dollars--slightly higher than the House's proposal but lower than the Senate's. The bill allowed the production of binary weapons but prohibited the production of the Bigeye chemical bomb. The bill included a statement, which was not legally binding, that the United States should not

exceed the quantitative limits in the SALT II treaty. Commenting on this decision, influential Senator S. Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) warned that if the President did not take the common congressional view into account and violated these limits, it would be every man for himself, as on a sinking ship.⁸ The statement on the ban on nuclear tests was not included in the bill. In exchange for this concession, however, the President informed the Congress that he would strive for the ratification of the American-Soviet agreements of 1974 (on the limitation of underground nuclear tests) and 1976 (on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes) and would then propose the commencement of negotiations to the Soviet side "on the limitation and eventual cessation of nuclear tests." The Democrats reserved the right to introduce their amendments again when the administration would submit its request for additional appropriations for the Pentagon for the current fiscal year to the new Congress at the beginning of 1987.

American journalists noted that the last Congress was extremely active in matters of arms control and some other foreign policy issues. In particular, they noted the active role of then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee R. Lugar (Republican, Indiana) and Republican Senator P. Laxalt (Nevada) in the change of governments in the Philippines. Congress' institution of economic sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa was a major defeat for the administration, because President Reagan had vehement objections to this move. To accomplish this, Congress (including the Republican-controlled Senate) had to override the President's veto on the bill on these sanctions.⁹

Without belittling the significance of this important congressional move, we should recall how this happened. It was a back-stage deal that made it possible to approve the bill on sanctions against South Africa and override the President's veto. The consent of the congressional right wing to the sanctions was received in exchange for a promise to support the allocation of 100 million dollars to the Nicaraguan contras. Furthermore, the sanctions approved by Congress were quite limited. The liberal wing and the moderates paid a high price for them: They had to support overt U.S. intervention in the affairs of Nicaragua and sanction the flagrant violation of international and American laws by the United States, thereby compounding the threat posed by the explosive situation in Central America.

The 99th Congress also passed a number of important acts on domestic policy and economic issues. The tax reform was probably the most important of these. This reform was initiated by President Reagan, who called it his highest priority in the sphere of domestic policy. Congress gave the President's idea a cool reception in 1985, but his threat to address the nation and accuse Congress of treating the "average American" unfairly forced the Capitol to take action. On several occasions it seemed that Congress would reject the reform, but it was eventually approved by the House and the Senate at the end of September 1986.

This resulted in the most radical changes in the system of taxation--at least in the last 50 years. The law puts taxpayers in three categories based on the size of personal income. According to forecasts, it will reduce personal

taxes by 6.1 percent in 1988. It is the general opinion that the "average American" will gain little from the reform. The 6 million poor on the lowest rung of the social ladder will stop paying taxes on their meager incomes, but the taxes of the most wealthy families will be reduced substantially. Corporate taxes will increase, and the loopholes in the law, permitting tax evasion, will be eliminated. Only time, however, will reveal the actual results of the reform. In any case, one of the senators who supported the reform, T. Harkin (Democrat, Iowa), declared: "If I had known that we would have to live with this tax law for 10 years and that it would remain unchanged, I would have voted against it. But we all know that it will be amended."¹⁰ In which direction? This becomes clear if we consider the fact that it stipulates preferential "transitional rules" for various companies, envisaging exemptions of 10.6 billion dollars. No "transitional rules," however, are envisaged for the ordinary taxpayer. The bigwigs of the business world will naturally find the right method of approaching the legislators to secure their interests in the future. As for the effects of the reform on the economy, Senator C. Levin (Democrat, Michigan) made this unequivocal remark: It will "turn the reduction of the deficit into a more difficult and less equitable matter."¹¹

In its last days of work, the 99th Congress also passed a new immigration act, an act on drug abuse prevention, and several others. When we evaluate the overall performance of the last Congress, we must say that although the administration gained many concessions from Congress, the leaders of party factions took the initiative in the legislative process in several important areas (such as budget priorities under the conditions of a deficit and some domestic and foreign policy issues, including arms control).

Summing up the results of its work, M. Hatfield, the Republican senator from Oregon, expressed the following opinion: "The 99th Congress will be remembered for what it did not do, what it could not prevent, and the historic opportunities it missed.... History will probably reveal the catastrophic implications of our refusal to take a slight risk for the sake of peace and join the Russians in their unilateral moratorium on underground nuclear tests. Historians will wonder why we lacked the ability to realize that today's blueprints are tomorrow's justification for another round of arms race escalation."¹²

It is true that the House of Representatives tried to help save the world from the danger of the continued escalation of the arms race, but, unfortunately, it was forced to retreat under the pressure of the opponents of disarmament. This regrettable outcome could lead to danger in the future.

The first steps of the 100th Congress testify that there are forces in the Capitol striving for the conclusion of disarmament agreements. The balance of power in Washington has changed considerably. The next few months will show whether common sense, realism, and the desire to avert nuclear disaster will prevail in the Capitol over those who preach unrestrained chauvinism and the striving for military superiority.

FOOTNOTES

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 10 January 1987.

2. SSHA: EPI, 1986, No 4, pp 77-78--Ed.
3. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 December 1986.
4. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 8 August 1986, p H5752.
5. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 8 August 1986.
6. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 8 August 1986, p H5739.
7. THE WASHINGTON POST, 11 October 1986.
8. Ibid.
9. SSHA: EPI, 1987, No 2, pp 80-86--Ed.
10. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 29 September 1986.
11. Ibid.
12. THE WASHINGTON POST, 30 October 1986.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1987

8588

CSO: 1803/08

REVIEW OF U.S. BOOK ON MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87
(signed to press 13 Mar 87) pp 104-105

[Review by A.A. Voronkov and Yu.A. Ushanov of book "A Reasonable Defense" by William W. Kaufman, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1986, XII + 114 pages]

[Text] The Brookings Institution, under whose auspices this book has been published, has traditionally been associated with the Democratic Party, which is one of the main reasons for its criticism of some of the current U.S. administration's undertakings and plans. The subject of this review is no exception. It was written by W. Kaufman, a renowned expert on the military economy who combines his work as an instructor in the prestigious Kennedy School of Administration at Harvard University with the duties of a consultant in the Brookings Institution foreign policy research program.

The issue of the effectiveness of military expenditures has become the subject of heated debates, Kaufman writes, especially on Capitol Hill. In particular, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has tried to calculate the return on these expenditures from the standpoint of their effect on the structure of the armed forces, their modernization, their combat readiness, and their material supply. A comparison of the present national leadership's actions with the policy line of President J. Carter indicates, the author writes, that the return on military appropriations is lower today than it was at the end of the 1970's. He says this is due to the tendency of client departments to put the emphasis on more complex and, consequently, more expensive technical systems.

The author doubts that the correct choices are being made between quality, cost, and effectiveness. In his opinion, the CBO analysis is flawed because it is based only on "initial" information about the armed forces and does not take the goals of military programs into account or consider the varying degrees of their implementation depending on changes in the cost of weapons systems. Rejecting the existing approaches to the determination of the effectiveness of military expenditures (comparisons with the military budget of the potential adversary, with its share of the GNP, with the composition and structure of armed forces, etc.), Kaufman uses the procedures of systems analysis and proposes his own model for the calculation of effectiveness.

To this end, he compares the structure and expenditures on the development of three types of armed forces: "basic" (those inherited by the current administration from the Carter government), "programmed" (those which could be created as a result of the Reagan Administration's programs of military development), and "combat efficient" (those proposed by the author).

What are the essential features of the "combat efficient"--or, as he calls them, "ideal"--armed forces? These forces, the author says, will not require crash programs of comprehensive modernization. On the contrary, he writes, in view of the fact that the life cycle of the main combat systems is around 20 years, they could be improved gradually.

Kaufman does not oppose the current administration's militarist plans. He does not doubt the rumors Western propaganda is spreading about the "expansionism" of the USSR. He believes in a strong defense for America, but a "reasonable" or "rational" defense, the kind producing a "maximum return" on each dollar spent.

According to the author's calculations, the creation of what he terms the "ideal" armed forces would cost 230 billion dollars less than the current projected figure for the next 5 years. Why has the administration overlooked the more reasonable, from the standpoint of the "cost-effectiveness" criterion, option for military construction? In the author's opinion, the answer to this question can be found in defects in the system for the management of military construction in the United States.

The constant conflicts between branches of the armed forces, their competition for appropriations, and the Defense Department's insufficient authority and information have made the more centralized management of military construction essential. An important step in this direction was taken under President Eisenhower, who wanted to strengthen the position of the secretary of defense so that he could establish budget quotas and settle disputes between branches of the armed forces as well as undertaking important initiatives (with regard to goals, weaponry composition, resource distribution, etc.).

The author gives a high rating to the performance of the secretary of defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administration, R. McNamara, who tried to put military planning on a scientific basis. McNamara's administrative reform, he writes, focused on systems analysis and the well-known PPB ("planning-programming-budgeting") system, modified forms of which are being employed in the Pentagon to this day. In a discussion of the procedural aspects of PPB, Kaufman underscores two important facts: It was the secretary of defense who had the prerogative of making changes in military programs, and there was an analytical approach to problem solving, based on "cost-effectiveness" criteria. Now many things have changed, he writes, especially in the planning of nuclear weapons: For example, the Army is deploying Pershings, the Air Force is deploying land-based cruise missiles, and the Navy is deploying sea-based cruise missiles (pp 100-102). All of this, the author stresses, is extremely expensive and costs the taxpayers huge sums. Besides this, the deliberate exaggeration of the Soviet Union's military strength and the insistent

appeals in Washington for "qualitative advances" in the construction of the American armed forces are stepping up the purchase of weapons (often of poor quality), and this unavoidably diminishes the effectiveness of military programs.

The final chapter of the book describes measures capable, in the author's opinion, of reversing these negative trends. The author believes that the main prerequisite for progress is the acknowledgement of the "competitive nature of the relations between the two superpowers" and a full awareness of the United States' position in this competition. He discusses the arms race and stresses that the further growth of the U.S. military budget cannot secure the efficient use of available resources in itself.

The author recommends reforms that are fully in line with the current criticism of military construction in the United States. Some of his suggestions agree with the conclusions of the Packard commission and other research groups which have studied various aspects of Department of Defense performance in recent years. All of this criticism is motivated by the concern of certain segments of the U.S. ruling class about the "inadequate impact" of military expenditures. Without questioning the current administration's aggressive foreign policy line, its critics (who include Kaufman) are trying to prove that "national security" goals can also be attained with much lower financial expenditures. All it will take is adjustments in the administrative mechanism.

This approach is characteristic of Democratic Party spokesmen, and many political analysts in the United States believe that the new Congress, in which the Democrats predominate, will institute stricter control over Pentagon requests.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1987

8588

CSO: 1803/08

CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION, ANALYSIS SERVICES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87
(signed to press 13 Mar 87) pp 112-115

[Article by M.A. Litvinova and V.N. Orlov; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The American lawmaking machinery is constantly in motion under the Capitol dome and in other official congressional buildings. As a result of a complex process, thousands of legislative proposals turn into hundreds of laws each year.¹ The interests of various segments of the ruling class are behind virtually each bill, and the process by which the legislative proposal becomes law therefore entails covert or overt battles between interest groups. Political and economic decisions which naturally cannot satisfy all sides are debated during the course of these battles. Decisions have to be substantiated to prove, at least hypothetically, that they are in the national interest, and this kind of substantiation requires solid arguments which are impossible without a sufficient degree of information.

Timely and thorough analytical information is therefore an essential part of the legislative process. In the past, Congress relied to a considerable extent on information received from executive agencies in the lawmaking process. Top-level officials from departments and agencies and representatives of non-governmental organizations (mostly lobbyists) are invited to hearings on various bills in congressional committees.

As conflicts between Congress and the administration accumulated, however, this practice ceased to satisfy the main legislative body in the United States. This became particularly apparent in the first half of the 1970's. The "divided rule" after the 1968 elections, when Republican R. Nixon arrived in the White House but the Democratic Party retained the majority in Congress, compounded the differences of opinion between the President and the Congress, and the Watergate affair intensified them to the maximum. Under these conditions, Congress took several steps to establish and strengthen its own information and analysis base, independent of the executive branch.

In 1970 the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress was redesignated the Congressional Research Service and was given expanded powers and functions by the Legislative Reorganization Act; the Office of Technology

Assessment was created in 1972 and the Congressional Budget Office was created in 1974 by a special act of Congress; an act on the General Accounting Office in 1974 expanded the functions of this agency, created in 1921, by giving it more analytical responsibilities.

As a result, Congress created its own system of research and analysis organizations, considerably reducing its dependence on the executive branch for information, without giving up its traditional channels of information for the legislative process. The fact that Congress spends around 400 million dollars a year to support these four organizations attests to the legislators' recognition of their important role.

Supplementing one another and coordinating their activities, these auxiliary congressional agencies provide legislators with statistics, procedural information, and analytical estimates and investigate a broad range of topics.

The GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE was established as a controlling and auditing agency, independent of the federal administration, to oversee the validity and effectiveness of the expenditure of public funds by executive departments. By the beginning of the 1960's evaluations of the effectiveness of federal programs were beginning to represent an increasing percentage of its work. For example, the GAO report on government contracts, questioning the super-profits of military-industrial monopolies, became famous. As we mentioned above, the powers of the GAO were expanded in the 1974 act. Its responsibilities included the evaluation of the administration's financial and economic performance, especially "cost-effectiveness" analyses of federal programs.

The head of the GAO (called the comptroller general in the United States) is appointed by the President with the Senate's approval. Representatives of this office can be summoned to testify at meetings of congressional committees. The GAO's responsibilities include advising congressional committees or individual congressmen and determining and satisfying their informational needs.

The results of government programs and the performance of federal departments can be evaluated either on the initiative of the head of the GAO or at the request of congressional houses or committees. In each case the result of the analysis is a report by the comptroller general, usually containing recommendations to heighten the effectiveness of the work of the executive staff. Each year the office prepares over a thousand such reports of varying length on different subjects. The range of the subject matter can be judged by the following titles: "The Changing Structure of the World Oil Market," "Environmental Protection: Objectives for the 1980's," "The Program of Naval Modernization--Potential for Improvement," "The Heightened Efficiency and Better Organization of Government Purchases of Specific Weapons Systems," etc. The heads of the departments discussed in the reports are obligated by law to submit written reports to Congress on the measures taken to implement relevant recommendations.

The GAO structure includes several sectorial divisions and a claims division. A special division supervises the work of regional representatives in 15 American cities. The international division has representatives in Frankfurt

(the FRG), New Delhi (India), and Manila (the Philippines). The office has a staff of more than 5,000. If necessary, the comptroller general is empowered to enlist the services of outside experts and consultants. The annual budget of the office is around 300 million dollars.

According to a GAO estimate, the annual savings in public funds as a result of errors discovered during the office's control operations is more than 10 times the size of its budget.

The OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT was created in 1972 to assist Congress in forecasting the long-range effects of legislative decisions regarding the incorporation of new equipment and technology. Its fields of research are decided by the Board of Technology Assessment, consisting of six senators, six congressmen, and an executive director appointed by Congress. This office also conducts research at the request of congressional committees. There is the assumption that research and forecasts will be unbiased and objective, but there have been several scandalous attempts by some legislators to use the office in their own interest.

Its research topics cover a broad range, and this is attested to by the following reports: "The Effects of Information Technology on Education," "Technical and Organizational Aspects of Toxic Waste Control," "The Competitive Potential of the United States in the Steel, Electronics and Automobile Industries," "Artificial Heart: Costs, Risks, Benefits," "The Effectiveness and Cost of Alcoholism Treatment," etc. In 1986 military-industrial groups in the United States and their proteges in Congress were enraged by a report on the catastrophic implications of "nuclear winter."

Although the office was formally created in 1972, it actually began its work in January 1974. In July of the same year a law was passed on congressional control of the budget and the impoundment of funds in the wake of the Watergate disclosures that led to President R. Nixon's resignation.

This act also created the CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. This office is regarded as an important element of the priority-setting procedure in the distribution of national resources by means of budget policy. The main reason for its creation was Congress' need for more complete information on budget matters, which was sometimes deliberately concealed by the executive agencies providing this information in the past.

The budget office analyzes tendencies in national economic development, compiles budget and economic forecasts, and proposes alternative budget policies on this basis. It conducts studies in various fields having some relationship to the federal budget at the request of congressional committees. Besides this, the office's duties include the calculation of the cost of implementing the bills introduced in Congress.

The CBO has a staff of over 200 and its work is organized in six main divisions: budget analysis, financial analysis, fiscal analysis, natural resources and trade, human resources and urban development, and national security and international affairs. The studies conducted in these divisions are published

in the form of reports--around 40-50 a year. The following titles provide some idea of their subject matter: "The Catastrophic Rise of the Medical Expenses of the Population (Excluding the Poor and Elderly)," "The Rising Prices of Weapons Systems: Current Prices and Possibilities for Their Reduction," "Public Works: Proposals for the 1980's," "Measures To Improve the Air Traffic Control Service," etc.

The CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE occupies a special place among the Capitol's information and analysis services. Whereas research functions are combined with operational responsibilities in the GAO and CBO and are confined to a limited field in the Office of Technology Assessment, the Congressional Research Service is a universal research establishment providing the highest legislative body with reference data and reports and conducting necessary investigations in the broadest range of fields.

The service is formally a division of the Library of Congress, but its director is granted complete independence in research activity and maximum administrative autonomy by law. At the same time, as part of the Library of Congress, the service has ready access to the rich resources of the national library.

Senators and congressmen, as private individuals or as official members of congressional committees, can ask this agency virtually any question, either in person, on the telephone, or in writing, and can expect a qualified and confidential reply.² The level of information and the amount of time required for its preparation depend on the nature and purpose of the request (whether it is a reply to a specific question from a voter or analytical materials needed for hearings on a bill).

All requests are registered in a special category. More than 300,000 requests for information are submitted each year. Simple requests, and these represent around 60 percent of the total, are submitted to the Congressional Reference Division, which operates in two shifts and can process the overwhelming majority of requests in less than a day. This division has reference centers in each of the five congressional office buildings, where requests can be submitted and where information services are performed locally if possible. More complicated requests, such as the evaluation of tendencies in the social and economic development of the United States during specific periods or the results of public opinion polls on various topics, are sent to the corresponding sectorial divisions; although these requests are comparatively rare (around 10 percent of the total), they take up to half of the working time of researchers.

The research service plans its scientific investigations with a view to the immediate and long-range informational needs of the Congress. Its functions include the compilation (by request and on its own initiative) of analytical surveys of U.S. domestic and foreign policy issues and economic and social problems; the preparation of reports on the legislative history of matters being discussed in Congress; the provision of competent analyses of legislative proposals and arguments for and against their passage; the proposal of alternative decisions on bills and the assessment of the possible results of

their passage. It is assumed that the service will operate as a neutral, objective research establishment unaffected by inter-party disagreements and party politics.

Selected research papers are published for a broader group of readers. The subject matter of these publications is quite diverse: "Astronauts (USA) and Cosmonauts (USSR): Statistical and Biographical Data," "Energy-Saving Technology: The Enhancement of Competitive Potential and Effectiveness," "Positive Factors in the Development of East-West Trade," "Should There Be a Ban on U.S. Military Intervention in the Western Hemisphere?" and others.

The anticipation of possible requests is the guiding principle of the service. Fact sheets and preliminary reports on various topics are compiled in accordance with the current congressional session's main areas of concern, and senators and congressmen are informed of their existence, particularly on the pages of the monthly bulletin CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH REVIEW. Interested legislators can obtain these reports in printed form or on cassettes or can read them on their computer displays (300 are stored and regularly updated in the data bank). Lists of brief reports (several thousand a year) are also published in the CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH REVIEW, and copies of these are sent to subscribers at their request.

More than 800 researchers specializing in various fields are employed by the service. The main divisions are international relations and national defense; economics; environment and natural resources; science and technology policy; government; education and public welfare; American law. The latter analyzes the legal aspects of government policy; it assesses the constitutionality of proposed bills and keeps track of their passage through all of the phases of the legislative process. Computers are used extensively in the work of the service.

The Congressional Research Service is the main coordinating institution in the system of congressional information and analysis services. The other three services have the same requisition rights as the committees and members of Congress, but these rights are not extended to agencies and establishments of the executive branch.³ It also has appropriations for contracts with U.S. science centers in the event that sufficiently qualified specialists cannot be found in one of the congressional information and analysis services.

FOOTNOTES

1. For example, the 98th Congress (1983-1985) discussed 12,198 legislative proposals and passed 613 laws.
2. In the knowledge that the budget allocations for the work of this service and the Library of Congress depend to a considerable extent on the quality of services performed for members of Congress, the heads of the research service strive for the complete satisfaction of the requests of their high-level clientele. Some reports have been leaked to the press that

several legislators have abused these privileges by ordering, for example, school compositions for their children.

3. This does not exclude the possibility of participation by experts from executive agencies in the symposiums and seminars conducted by the research service.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya", 1987

8588

CSO: 1803/08

CHRONOLOGY OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS DEC 86-FEB 87

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87
(signed to press 13 Mar 87) pp 125-127

[Text] December 1986

2 -- In his statement at a press conference in Moscow on the results of the third round of the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the cessation of nuclear tests, Chairman A.M. Petrosyants of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy stressed that the American side's position at the talks had made it impossible to begin drafting a treaty.

2-6 -- A working meeting of members of the USSR and U.S. delegations at the talks on nuclear and space arms was held in Geneva at the suggestion of the Soviet side. The Soviet group at the meeting was headed by Ambassador V.P. Karpov, and the American group was headed by Ambassador M. Kampelman.

3-6 -- Working groups of the Dartmouth Conference on arms limitation and reduction and political aspects of Soviet-American relations met in Washington. The Soviet delegation was headed by Academician G.A. Arbatov, director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

4-6 -- The ninth session of the joint Soviet-American commission on trade was held in Washington. The head of the USSR delegation, Minister of Foreign Trade B.I. Aristov, and USSR Ambassador to the United States Yu.V. Dubinin were received by President Reagan. A protocol on the results of the session was signed. By mutual agreement, the next session will be held in Moscow in 1987.

6 -- A statement by the Soviet Government was published, saying that the United States had exceeded the limits stipulated in the SALT II treaty of 1,320 MIRV'ed strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers with cruise missiles. The statement stresses that the Soviet side believes there is still time to stop the dangerous chain of events the current U.S. administration is provoking with its irresponsible actions, and the USSR will therefore continue to observe the limits set in the SALT I agreement and the SALT II treaty.

9-11 -- The 10th annual meeting of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC) was held in New York. A resolution passed at the meeting

says that Soviet-American trade and economic relations should be developed to a point meeting the potential capabilities of the two leading industrial powers in the world. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev sent a message of greetings to the 10th annual ASTEC meeting.

14 -- Another nuclear device was tested on the American testing site in Nevada. The force of the explosion was from 20 to 150 kilotons.

14-18 -- American Democratic Senator G. Hart visited the Soviet Union as the guest of the Parliamentary Group of the USSR. He was received by M.S. Gorbachev and by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze and CPSU Central Committee Secretary A.F. Dobrynin.

15 -- The CPSU Central Committee expressed its deep sympathies to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, USA, in connection with the untimely death of National Chairman of the CP USA Henry Winston.

18 -- The Soviet Government published a statement specifically proposing the commencement of full-scale talks on a total nuclear test ban without delay. During these talks, the Soviet Union would also be willing to negotiate the sequential attainment of this objective, presupposing the ratification of the Soviet-American agreements of 1974 and 1976 and the imposition of interim restrictions on the number and force of nuclear explosions. It said that the USSR was willing to continue adhering to its moratorium, but it would resume nuclear tests after the first U.S. nuclear explosion in the coming year. If the United States should stop all nuclear tests, the USSR will be willing on any day of any month to stop the work on its testing program on a mutual basis, the statement said.

20 -- The U.S. and Canada visit of a delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet, headed by PRAVDA editor-in-chief V.G. Afanasyev, came to an end. An agreement on a series of televised debates between American and Soviet parliamentarians in 1987 was concluded.

22 -- A decision to renew the Soviet-American agreement of 23 May 1972 on cooperation in environmental protection for another 5 years was made at a session of the joint Soviet-American commission on cooperation in environmental protection in Washington.

28 -- A TASS statement published in connection with the serious escalation of tension in Chad said that the imperialist powers, especially the United States, are fueling the conflict with their actions. These actions could cause the Chad conflict to become a dangerous seat of international tension, the statement stressed.

31 -- In response to the questions of American journalist J. Kingsbury-Smith, M.S. Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet people want to live in peace with Americans and that they do not hate them. M.S. Gorbachev mentioned the importance of not only preserving the ABM treaty but also reinforcing it, stating that agreements on strategic arms limitation would be impossible without it.

January 1987

- 1 -- President R. Reagan's New Year's message to the people of the Soviet Union was broadcast by the central Soviet radio network.
- 4 -- A.F. Dobrynin received L. Tisch, the general director of the American Columbia Broadcasting System corporation (CBS), in Moscow.
- 9 -- A published Soviet Government statement said that imperialist forces are taking advantage of the continued Iran-Iraq conflict to build up their military presence in the Persian Gulf zone. The statement exposes the U.S. attempts to justify its maneuvers and covert arms sales with references to the so-called "Soviet threat" to the countries of the region.
- 12 -- A group of former Soviet citizens who had been allowed to return to their homeland arrived in Moscow from New York.
- 13 -- It was announced at a press conference in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Soviet side had proposed a higher level of leadership of the delegations at the talks on nuclear and space arms to the American side. First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Yu.M. Vorontsov was appointed the head of the Soviet delegation. The head of the U.S. delegation, M. Kampelman, was promoted to special adviser to the secretary of state.
- 14 -- The first round of the Soviet-American talks on the creation of centers to reduce the nuclear danger was held in Geneva.
A.F. Dobrynin received U.S. Ambassador to the USSR A. Hartman at his request. They discussed several matters connected with the resumption of Soviet-American talks in Geneva.
- 15 -- The 7th round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms began with a meeting of the heads of the delegations in Geneva.
American Secretary of Commerce M. Baldrige announced the administration's decision to lift the restrictions that had been in force for the last 9 years on deliveries of equipment for the oil and gas industry to the USSR.
- 16 -- Sessions of the groups on space weapons, on strategic offensive weapons, and on intermediate-range nuclear weapons were held at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms.
- 19 -- A message from General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev to the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania in connection with their declaration on the past year said that even if the Soviet Union should be forced to resume nuclear tests, it will persist in advocating full-scale talks on a total nuclear test ban. The USSR is willing to conduct these talks with any number of participants and in any forum, but only if the United States also participates in them.
- 22 -- The Soviet-American talks on the cessation of nuclear tests were resumed in Geneva. The USSR delegation was headed by Chairman A.M. Petrosyants of

the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, and the U.S. delegation was headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy R. Barker.

At a press conference in Moscow a USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said that the launching of two new Soviet nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles was not a violation of the SALT II treaty because the ships had not undergone deployment tests.

It was also reported that a Soviet note had been sent to the U.S. State Department to call the U.S. actions to legitimize the American annexation of part of Micronesia arbitrary and invalid.

23 -- According to a TASS statement, the joint drafting of documents began at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva in the groups on space, strategic offensive, and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Matters are being discussed thoroughly by delegation heads and group leaders.

26-28 -- Representatives of the academic community and the public of the USSR, the United States, Bulgaria, Greece, and West Berlin took part in a round-table discussion in Moscow on "USSR-United States: How We See Each Other."

28 -- Presenting the traditional State of the Union address to a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives of the American Congress, R. Reagan again misrepresented the U.S. approach to the arms control talks with the USSR.

29 -- The latest round of the talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe began with a plenary meeting of the delegations in Vienna.

February

3 -- A delegation from the American Council on Foreign Relations arrived in Moscow as the guests of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Its members included prominent politicians and public spokesmen: P. Peterson, H. Brown, C. Vance, D. Jones, J. Kirkpatrick, H. Kissinger, M. Mandelbaum, C. Mathias, S. Tarnoff, and W. Highland. On 4 February the delegation was received by M.S. Gorbachev. They discussed a broad range of topics. M.S. Gorbachev stressed that Soviet-American relations are still at a crossroads, and that enough will and strength must be found to make the turn. There are no alternatives to coexistence. Delegation members C. Vance and H. Kissinger were received by A.F. Dobrynin on 3 and 4 February and by A.A. Gromyko on 5 and 6 February at their request. The present unsatisfactory state of Soviet-American relations and the search for possible ways of correcting these relations in line with the dictates of the present day were discussed in detail.

The United States conducted a nuclear test on the test site in Nevada, the 25th test since the start of the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests.

The first issue of the magazine published by the Samantha Smith Foundation came out in the United States. The purpose of the new publication is the same as that of the foundation--mutual understanding between all peoples on earth, especially the Americans and the Soviet people.

3-27 -- The Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms continued in Geneva. The heads of the USSR and U.S. delegations met for discussions.

7 -- An article by General Secretary of the CP USA G. Hall was published in PRAVDA. At the request of the editors, he expressed his opinion of the January CPSU Central Committee plenum and the issues discussed at the plenum.

9 -- A Soviet-American agreement on cooperation in the field of mass physical culture and sports was signed in Washington.

14 -- While he was in Moscow, prominent American public spokesman A. Hammer, chairman of the board of Occidental Petroleum, presented a painting by Russian artist I.S. Kulikov to the Soviet Cultural Foundation and contributed 100,000 dollars to the foundation.

14-16 -- The international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World and the Survival of Humanity" was held in Moscow.

A group of Americans who had come to Moscow to attend the forum made a statement, which said in particular: "We are united in our desire to work with our Soviet colleagues on turning Soviet-American relations from costly and dangerous confrontation into peaceful cooperation, which will be in our mutual interest and the interest of all humanity."

M.S. Gorbachev presented a speech at the forum.

15-22 -- "Amerika," a television mini-series depicting the "horrors of the Soviet occupation of the United States," was shown on the ABC television network during the week. The Discovery cable TV company began showing Soviet television programs with the assistance of Orbit Technologies, the corporation transmitting Soviet programs to the United States by an agreement with the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting.

17 -- A.F. Dobrynin spoke with A. Hammer and Pepsico Chairman of the Board D. Kendall. They discussed new approaches to the development of Soviet-American trade and economic relations. On 19 February A.F. Dobrynin received President J. Giffen of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council.

18 -- The Soviet-American consultations on all aspects of the problem of concluding an effective and verifiable international convention on a total and universal chemical weapons ban were resumed in Geneva.

19 -- A.A. Gromyko received U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Arthur Hartman in the Kremlin in connection with the end of his stay in the Soviet Union and his impending return to the United States. The meeting was attended by temporary charge d'affaires Richard Coombs. On 20 February A. Hartman left Moscow.

20 -- An agreement on cooperation between the Main Archives Administration of the USSR Council of Ministers and the American Council of Learned Societies was signed in Moscow. This document, the first of its kind in the history of our countries, envisages the creation of a joint Soviet-American commission to regulate relations between the archives of the two sides. An extensive program of cooperation was drafted, and exchanges of publications on the management of archives and of copies of archival documents and joint exhibits were planned. An agreement was reached to facilitate the access of specialists to the archives of both sides.

28 -- A published statement by M.S. Gorbachev proposed that the issue of intermediate-range missiles in Europe be distinguished from the general group of issues and that a separate agreement be concluded on this matter without delay.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "SShA--ekonomika, politika, ideologiya",
1987

8588

CSO: 1803/08

- END -